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Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason
Analysis
Abstract

The rule of reason articulated by the Supreme Court in 1918 in Chicago Board of Trade has long been the
target of scorn and ridicule by scholars and judges. The rule, which is used to determine the legality of
restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, instructs courts to identify and balance a restraint's competitive
effects - restraints that are net procompetitive are legal. Critics argue that the rule is easy to state but
impossible to apply, as it asks courts to identify the unidentifiable and balance the unbalanceable. Despite the
steady criticism, the rule has remained the exclusive rule of reason approach of the Supreme Court for nearly a
century.
Yet, perhaps in an attempt to improve the test, each of the federal circuits has incorporated the less restrictive
alternative inquiry as an independent and dispositive prong of the rule of reason. Under this newly created
test, a restraint that achieves a net procompetitive benefit - and thus is legal under the Supreme Court
standard - is illegal if the procompetitive benefits could have been attained by a less restrictive alternative.
Surprisingly, the new test has not only avoided much criticism, but has received widespread support from
scholars across the ideological spectrum.
Rather than improve the rule of reason, however, use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive
factor transforms an already difficult analysis into a virtually unworkable multi-tiered balancing adventure. It
adds a new level of confusion and opacity to Section 1 analysis and threatens to change the role of antitrust
law from an ex ante deterrent of net anticompetitive behavior to an ex post regulator of net procompetitive
business decisions.
This Article examines the historical use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry and its emergence in the
modern rule of reason analysis. The Article argues that use of the inquiry in the modern rule of reason is both
theoretically and practically flawed. The Article concludes that proof of less restrictive alternatives should be
used solely as proof of anticompetitive intent, which in turn should only be used as one factor to aid courts in
balancing the competitive effects of a restraint of trade. Such use of the search for less restrictive alternatives is
consistent with nearly one hundred years of Supreme Court precedent and maintains the proper focus of the
antitrust laws on the competitive impact of the restraint.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1918, the rule of reason articulated in Chicago
1
Board of Trade has been under constant attack. Referred to as the
2
“antitrust equivalent to . . . water torture,” the rule, which is the
primary method for determining the legality of restraints under
3
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, is criticized for, inter alia,
representing nothing more than a muddled set of platitudes with no
4
meaningful standards. The test requires courts to identify and
balance the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects of
the restraint at issue to determine the restraint’s net competitive
5
While the purpose of the test—to prohibit net
effect.
anticompetitive conduct—is clear, critics argue that its execution is
cripplingly obtuse and is akin to the proverbial “search for a needle
6
in a haystack.” Despite the persistent assaults on the rule and calls
for its reform, the Supreme Court has not veered from the course it
7
set in 1918.
Yet, while the Supreme Court has adhered to the same rule of
reason analysis for nearly a century, the circuit courts have
dramatically changed the test, as each circuit has adopted its own
version of a less restrictive alternative inquiry as an independent and
8
dispositive prong. The search for less restrictive alternatives has a
long and interesting juridical history. Though more commonly
associated with constitutional law, the means-oriented less restrictive
alternative inquiry originated in common law restraint of trade cases
9
and was the first rule of reason test in antitrust law. While the
1. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–41 (1918).
2. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 475–76 (6th Cir. 1992)
(quotation omitted).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 15 (1981) (commenting that the rule
of reason is “[a] standard so poorly articulated and particularized, applied by
tribunals so poorly equipped to understand and apply it”).
5. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
6. Panel Discussion, Market Power and Entry Barriers, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 714
(1989).
7. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (examining the
facts of the case using the rule of reason analysis).
8. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff can overcome a showing that the restraint has a net
procompetitive effect by identifying an alternative means of achieving the same
effect).
9. The classic formulation of the early test is contained in then-Judge Taft’s
much-lauded decision in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
(1898). See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger
Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 23, 37 (1993) (discussing the importation of the inquiry from antitrust law to
constitutional law).
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inquiry was embraced by the Supreme Court in constitutional law
jurisprudence, particularly during the civil rights movement, the
Supreme Court refused to adopt its use in rule of reason cases, opting
10
instead for the balancing test in Chicago Board of Trade. The inquiry,
therefore, disappeared entirely from rule of reason jurisprudence for
nearly half a century, only to gradually reemerge as a distinct part of a
new rule of reason test.
Under the new rule of reason test, a restraint that achieves a net
procompetitive impact—and thus is legal under the Supreme Court
standard—is illegal if that impact could have been attained by a less
11
restrictive alternative. Perhaps in an attempt to improve the rule of
reason analysis, the new test has been adopted by every circuit and
has received nearly universal approval from scholars across the
12
ideological spectrum. Rather than add clarity to the rule of reason,
however, this additional prong adds a new level of confusion and
opacity to Section 1 analysis and changes the role of antitrust law
from an ex ante deterrent of net anticompetitive behavior to an ex
post regulator of net procompetitive business decisions. If the
Chicago Board of Trade approach requires courts to search for a needle
in a haystack, the new rule of reason requires a search for the
sharpest needle in the haystack. The new rule threatens to
undermine antitrust enforcement and is inconsistent with almost one
hundred years of Supreme Court precedent. Nevertheless, it has
managed to avoid serious criticism. This Article examines the
theoretical and practical flaws of this new rule of reason and argues
that the less restrictive alternative inquiry should not be an
independent and dispositive prong of the rule of reason. Instead,
proof of less restrictive alternatives should be used solely as proof of
intent to aid courts in balancing the competitive effects of a restraint
of trade.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I provides an overview of
the evolution of the rule of reason analysis in antitrust law and
explores the creation, disappearance, and reemergence of the less
10. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2725
(2007) (overturning the per se rule against vertical price restraints in favor of a rule
of reason approach because there are occasions when such restraints will have a
procompetitive effect).
11. See, e.g., Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56 (outlining the three part analysis framework as
the proper way to determine if Lysol trademark agreements produced
anticompetitive effects and harmed the public).
12. See generally Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive Alternatives
Doctrine: A Case Study of its Application in the Sports Context, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 227, 231
(2002) (discussing the rule of reason standards used by different circuits and noting
their scholarly support).
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restrictive alternative inquiry. This section explains how use of the
inquiry by circuit courts has created a “New Rule of Reason” that is
fundamentally different from the test first announced by the
Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade. Part II discusses the
theoretical flaws of the use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as
part of the New Rule of Reason analysis. Part III examines the
practical difficulties of the inquiry as part of the New Rule of Reason.
Part IV explains why the inquiry cannot be used as a heuristic to
replace the traditional Chicago Board of Trade rule of reason analysis.
Part V discusses the proper role of the inquiry and provides a more
workable framework for antitrust analysis of agreements between
competitors.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RULE OF REASON AND
THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS

A. The Original “Rule of Reason” and the Origins of the
Less Restrictive Alternative Test
Much of modern antitrust law focuses on the dangers of
monopolization and agreements among horizontal competitors. The
primary fear is that monopolies and horizontal cartels will reduce
output and raise prices to consumers. A complex body of antitrust
law has therefore developed to prevent anticompetitive restraints and
protect consumer welfare. This modern approach to antitrust law,
however, bears little resemblance to its common law origins.
Prohibitions against restraints of trade began in the fifteenth
century when judges declared illegal all contracts that prevented a
13
person from practicing his profession. Most of these cases arose in
14
As the common law
the context of covenants not to compete.
13. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23,
23 n.1 (1964) (noting that the public’s need for any available skilled labor due to its
scarcity necessitated such an approach limiting the restrictions on covenants not to
compete). As then-Professor Taft explained:
It was regarded as against the general interest of freedom of labor and trade
to enforce a man’s agreement to disable himself to earn his own livelihood,
and so to become a charge upon the community. Probably that was the sole
purpose at first. Later on the kings exercised the power to grant the
privilege to individuals of exclusive dealing in particular trades, and they did
this by patents for monopolies. Naturally, such an exclusion of all others
from any particular business or trade by arbitrary royal act stirred the
indignation of the people, and the abolition of those statutory monopolies
followed.
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1914).
14. The first reported case to rule on the validity of a covenant not to compete
was Dyer’s Case, where the court held that the plaintiff’s restraint was per se illegal,
concluding “by God, if the plaintiff were here he would go to prison until he paid a
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developed, courts recognized that some of these restraints should be
permitted because they were used in support and furtherance of
legitimate goals. In order to determine which restraints were
permissible, or “reasonable,” the courts adapted a form of the less
15
restrictive alternative test as part of an early “rule of reason.” The
16
initial version of this rule was discussed in Mitchel v. Reynolds, where
the court held that a covenant not to compete will be enforced only
17
where the restraint is “particular.”
The test was more fully
18
articulated in Horner v. Graves:

fine to the King.” Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105
N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (quoting Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, Mich., pl.
26 (1414)). An Ohio Judge later eloquently explained the reason for the per se
illegality of the covenants:
Over five hundred years of colorful history look down on this type of
litigation. . . . Skill in a trade was the vital factor in a man’s economic status
and it was obtainable only through apprenticeship to an experienced
worker. The guild system permitted a man to work only in the trade in
which he was apprenticed. Membership in a guild was not easily attained.
Travel was difficult. Strangers were not welcome. If a man couldn’t work at
his trade in his particular locality, he could hardly work at all; might become
a pauper; and the public would be deprived of a worker at a time when the
Black Death had made workmen scarce. In that background when, in 1415,
the celebrated Dyer’s Case came before Judge Hall (Hull?), he became so
enraged by an attempt to restrain a dyer from working in a town for just a
half year that in bad French he cursed the deal void . . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
15. See infra notes 17–33 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the
rule of reason test).
16. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (K.B.).
17. Id. The analysis of less restrictive alternatives serves a significant role in
constitutional law, see infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text, but constitutional
law borrowed the analysis from antitrust and restraint of trade jurisprudence, see Yao
& Dahdouh, supra note 9, at 37.
The first use of the inquiry in United States constitutional law occurred in 1821.
See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821) (limiting the contempt power of
Congress to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed”). The inquiry was later
used in the nineteenth century to limit the police power of the state. See, e.g., Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (“To justify the state in thus interposing its
authority in behalf [sic] of the public, it must appear . . . that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose . . . .”). The inquiry
now plays a key role in strict scrutiny cases. See infra notes 159–162 and
accompanying text.
German administrative law utilized a similar doctrine to limit the exercise of its
police power. The doctrine, referred to as “The Rule of the Mildest Means,” requires
that “the means least burdensome to the individual affected and to the public must
be chosen.” Fritz Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: Exercise of Police
Power, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 289 (1942). The rule was created, in part, to prevent the
police “from shooting sparrows with cannon balls.” Id. at 285 (quotation omitted).
18. (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (K.B.). The court held that the restriction on
a dentist’s assistant was unreasonably overbroad because it prevented the assistant
from practicing within 100 miles of his employer’s town. Id. at 288. Given the
personal nature of the service and the limits on transportation at the time, the court
had no difficulty in finding that the covenant was more restrictive than necessary. Id.
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[W]e do not see how a better test can be applied to the question
. . . than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to
afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of
whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests
of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary
protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only
be oppressive; and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law,
19
unreasonable.

This rule of reason was consistently used by courts in England and
20
21
the United States before and after the passage of the Sherman Act.
Significantly, not all of these cases involved covenants not to
22
compete. For example, in More v. Bennett, the restraint at issue was
an agreement among Chicago stenographers to fix a schedule of
23
prices. The court applied the “reasonably necessary” test in striking
24
25
down the agreement. And, in Collins v. Locke, the court upheld as
reasonably necessary an agreement among stevedores in a certain
26
port to divide up the stevedoring business.
This rule of reason became the centerpiece of then-Judge Taft’s
27
much-lauded 1898 opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
28
Co. In Addyston, Taft synthesized the common law decisions from
the United States and England and set forth the definitive standard

19. Id. at 287.
20. See, e.g., Tallis v. Tallis, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 482, 487 (K.B.) (“A covenant . . .
is not void as being in restraint of trade, unless the restraint appears to be greater
than the protection of the covenantee can reasonably require.”); Hitchcock v. Coker,
(1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 167, 173 (K.B.) (“[W]here the restraint of a party from
carrying on a trade is larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom
the contract is made can possibly require, such restraint must be considered
unreasonable in law.”). For a comprehensive discussion of the early covenant-not-tocompete cases, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 629–46 (1960).
21. See, e.g., More v. Bennett, 29 N.E. 888, 891 (Ill. 1892) (explaining that “to be
valid, [the restraint] must be no more extensive than is reasonably necessary for the
protection of the vendee in the enjoyment of the business purchased”); Arthur
Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P.
1952) (“Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is no greater than necessary to
protect the employer in some legitimate interest?”).
22. 29 N.E. 888, 891 (Ill. 1892).
23. Id. at 890.
24. Id. at 891.
25. (1879) 4 App. Cas. 674 (P.C.).
26. Id. at 687.
27. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 26 (1993) (“Indeed, given the time at which it was written, [the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in] Addyston must rank as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust
opinions in the history of the law.”).
28. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d and modified, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1898).
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29

for determining the legality of a restraint of trade. Taft first drew a
30
distinction between naked and ancillary restraints. Naked restraints
31
had no purpose other than restraining trade and thus were illegal.
Ancillary restraints, such as most covenants not to compete, however,
were incidental and collateral to a legitimate agreement and were
thus subject to a “rule of reason” analysis (the “Addyston Rule of
32
Reason”). Under the Addyston Rule of Reason, a restraint was legal
if “reasonably necessary” for the underlying legitimate agreement to
33
exist at all. Taft explained that a restraint was reasonably necessary
if it was “reasonably adapted and limited to the necessary protection
34
of a party in carrying out [the underlying agreement.]”
29. See id. at 279–82 (noting that prior to the Sherman Act, unreasonable
restraints of trade were merely unenforceable contracts) (referencing Horner v.
Graves, (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.)).
30. Id. at 279–80.
31. Id. at 282.
32. See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The
Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of
Trade Analysis, in 15 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 62 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. &
Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1992) (explaining that an ancillary restraint “functions to
facilitate, that is, ‘regulates,’ a joint productive effort or other primary transaction
between the parties. The term ‘regulation’ . . . implies that a control exists to serve
some other function or purpose beyond control for its own sake”).
33. Addyston, 85 F. at 281. As President Taft later remarked, the ancillary
restraints discussed in Addyston were legal:
because it was said that they were reasonable restraints of trade. Now, they
were reasonable not because in a general way the judges thought they would
not hurt anybody under the particular circumstances, but they were held to
be reasonable as measured by the lawful purpose of the principal contract to
which they were subsidiary and ancillary.
This gave a definition for judicial guidance. It laid down the purposes to
which such a contract must be confined, and it was not open to the criticism
that it enlarged judicial discretion into legislative action. . . . What I wish to
insist upon and emphasize as much as I can is that when it is said that a
contract in restraint of trade was reasonable at common law, it was not a
contract in which the restraint was the sole or chief object of the contract.
The restraint was a mere instrument to carry out a different and lawful
purpose of the main contract.
TAFT, supra note 13, at 11–12.
34. Addyston, 85 F. at 283. Then-Professor Taft would later give a more detailed
explanation of the rule:
If a man had a business and wished to sell it, with its good will, he could get a
better price if he might lawfully bind himself not to interfere with that
business which he was selling by engaging in the same business within the
same territory. This was in the interest of the purchaser, because he wished
to secure the benefit of his bargain and make legitimate profit out of it, and
it was not contrary to the public interest, because it did not affect the public.
The condition of trade was not changed by the transfer from one to the
other, and the status quo was maintained by the agreement.
Of course, if the restraint upon the seller’s going into business was larger in
its scope than the business which he sold, either in the matter of territory or
in the character of the business, it was beyond the proper and legitimate
purpose of such a restraining term of the contract.
TAFT, supra note 13, at 8–9.

568

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:561

The determinative factor in the Addyston Rule of Reason and
common law rule of reason cases was the same: a restraint was
reasonable, and thus legal, if it was narrowly tailored, or no more
restrictive than necessary to accomplish the legitimate ends of the
35
underlying contract. This test raised the following question: “what
is necessary in the particular instance for the protection of the
36
convenantee in his enjoyment of the main contract”?
Although
couched in terms of “reasonable necessity,” the test—which would
later be imported into U.S. constitutional law—was the earliest
37
That is, the
formulation of the less restrictive alternative test.
restraint was reasonably necessary if no less restrictive alternatives
38
were available.
The Addyston Rule of Reason was thus a means-oriented inquiry
that ignored the overall competitive impact of the restraint, focusing
solely on the legitimacy of the underlying agreement and the
39
necessity of the restraint ancillary to that agreement. Judge Taft had
35. See, e.g., Clarence E. Eldridge, A New Interpretation of the Sherman Act, 13 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1914) (“[T]he restraint imposed must be no greater than was necessary
to a full consummation of the indispensable main, lawful purpose.”).
36. Antitrust Significance of Covenants Not to Compete, 64 MICH. L. REV. 503, 507
(1966) [hereinafter Covenants]; see also, e.g., Hall Mfg. Co. v. W. Steel & Iron Works,
227 F. 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1915) (explaining that legality was determined by “whether
on the facts of the particular case the restraint is greater than is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the purchaser of the business and good will”).
37. See Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due
Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1967) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
abandoned the concept of economic due process through its failure to extend the
less restrictive alternative principle to economic regulations); Yao & Dahdouh, supra
note 9, at 37 (discussing the strict application of the least restrictive alternatives test
used in constitutional law).
38. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 66 (noting that the measure of legality
under a reasonable necessity test is whether less restrictive alternatives exist); Thomas
E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 893, 908–09
n.73 (1987) (explaining that the language in the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Addyston
may “be read to encompass an examination of less restrictive alternatives”); Stephen
F. Ross, Network Economic Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania’s Efficiency Analysis, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 945, 957 (2001) (explaining that the less restrictive alternative analysis
“dates back to the progenitors of the rule of reason under English common law”);
Richard S. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34
(1981) (observing that “for all practical purposes, it would seem, the criteria for
‘reasonable necessity’ and ‘least restrictive alternative’ must be the same”); see also,
e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 8
(Federal Judicial Center 1981) (explaining that “one must ask whether there is a less
restrictive way to accomplish that objective or, stated another way, whether the
restriction is ‘reasonably necessary’ to achieve it”); Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule
of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1322 (“A direction to
enforce only restraints that are no larger than necessary is but another way of saying
that there are no less restrictive alternatives.”).
39. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) (arguing that the “genius” of a meansoriented test “is that outcomes can be determined at the threshold without the need
for messy balancing”).
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cautioned against the use of a cost-benefit analysis or balancing test in
40
The search for less
gauging the reasonableness of a restraint.
restrictive alternatives thus played an essential normative role in the
Addyston Rule of Reason, as it served as the only check—other than
the
threshold
ancillary/naked
distinction—on
the
41
Once a restraint was
anticompetitiveness of the restraint.
determined to have some legitimate or procompetitive purpose, the
Addyston test was used only to maximize the efficiency of the method
used to achieve that purpose. Put another way, the inquiry was used
to minimize the anticompetitive impact of the restraint. It was not
used, and cannot be used, to determine the net effects of a restraint.
The operative question asked by the test was thus not whether the
procompetitive benefits of the restraint outweighed its
anticompetitive effects. The less restrictive alternative inquiry was not
42
The
used as a proxy or heuristic for net competitive effect.
identification, analysis, and weighing of procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects was completely absent from the inquiry. If a
40. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d and modified, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1898); see
also KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 100 (2003) (noting that Taft thought it inappropriate for courts to
perform a “general cost-benefit reasoning in every case”).
41. See, e.g., TAFT, supra note 13, at 20 (“[W]e find that the state of the common
law when Congress passed the anti-trust statute was that contracts in restraint of
trade, in so far as they restrained a party to the contract, were void, unless they were
reasonable in the sense that they were merely ancillary to a main contract which was
lawful in its purpose, and were reasonably adapted and limited to that purpose.”);
Blake, supra note 20, at 632 (observing that in “early common law . . . restraints
incident to the transfer of business interests have always been held valid if reasonably
tailored to the scope of the transaction”); Eldridge, supra note 35, at 6 (noting that a
restraint of trade “is valid and enforceable unless the restraint is greater than
necessary for the protection of the parties and therefore unreasonable”); Gary R.
Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the
Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 1005 (1988) (noting that the preSherman Act ancillary restraints doctrine “focused only on what in modern antitrust
parlance would be considered procompetitive effects”); Donald F. Turner, Some
Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 4 (“The salutary
principle of invalidating arrangements that are more restrictive than necessary was
one of the great developments of the common law . . . It was indeed the heart of a
properly applied ancillary restraint doctrine.”). As Justice Harlan stated in his
dissent in the Sugar Trust Case:
[A]n agreement which operates merely in partial restraint of trade is good,
provided it be not unreasonable, and there be consideration to support it.
In order that it may not be unreasonable, the restraint imposed must not be larger
than is required for the necessary protection of the party with whom the contract is
made.
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 24 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Covenants, supra note 36, at 510 (“[T]he sole standard under federal
law should be whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect the main
transaction.”).
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less restrictive method were available, the method being used was, by
43
definition, unreasonable, regardless of its net effects.
B. The Sherman Act, Board of Trade Rule of Reason,
and the Search for Net Effects
The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 and it subsequent
interpretation by the Supreme Court changed the course of antitrust
jurisprudence. Though many disagree with the wisdom of the course
44
change, there is no question that the Sherman Act and its
45
subsequent interpretation represented a dramatic shift. The Act,
read literally, condemns “[e]very contract” in restraint of trade,
46
requiring the courts to give it shape and meaning. Early on, the
Supreme Court struggled with the task and issued a series of
confusing and inconsistent opinions, occasionally relying on an
47
Addyston-type Rule of Reason.
A significant shift in antitrust
jurisprudence occurred in 1911, when the Court broke away from the
Addyston test and established a new set of rules in Standard Oil Co. v.
48
United States for determining the legality of a restraint of trade. This
new standard focused on the “necessary effect” of the restraint at
43. The less restrictive alternative inquiry also became part of contract and
property jurisprudence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 187 (1969);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932). For a detailed discussion of the
use of the inquiry in these contexts, see Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is
there a Text in this Class?” The Conflict between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 619, 624, 639 (2005).
44. In 1910, Justice Holmes wrote that “I don’t disguise my belief that the
Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence,” and
referred to the Act as “foolish, absurd, and stupid.” MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN
PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF RULE AND DISCRETION 13 (1982)
(quotations omitted). See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The
Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1193–94 (1988) (arguing that the
Court’s decisions involving the rule of reason have been largely silent on its overall
application).
45. See, e.g., William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Judicial
Interpretation, 68 YALE L.J. 900, 918 (1959) (noting that the Supreme Court “took the
explicit position that the Sherman Act went beyond the common law”). But see
Carstensen, supra note 32, at 60, 63 (noting that while Chicago Board of Trade
“suggest[ed] a radical change in direction” in antitrust law, the “decision was but an
application of the substantive tests of ancillary and reasonably necessity which the
Court had adumbrated in the prior quarter of a century”).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). For a comprehensive early history of the Sherman Act,
see Letwin, supra note 45.
47. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49–52
(1912) (relying on precedent other than Addyston, to review a corporation that
manufactures eighty-five percent of all enameled ironware); Shawnee Compress Co.
v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 434–35 (1908) (finding, without citation to Addyston, that
the lease in question was an illegal restraint of trade); see also, e.g., Carstensen, supra
note 32, at 57 (discussing the use of an Addyston-type functional analysis by the
Supreme Court from 1895–1918).
48. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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issue. Justice White elaborated on the test later that year in United
50
States v. American Tobacco Co., holding that the Sherman Act only
prohibited agreements “which operated to the prejudice of the
public interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly
obstructing the due course of trade, or which, either because of their
inherent nature or effect, or because of the evident purpose of the
51
acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade.”
In 1918, Justice Brandeis capped the dramatic paradigm shift in
antitrust law and articulated the classic post-Sherman Act test for
determining the legality of a restraint under Section 1 of the
52
Sherman Act in Chicago Board of Trade.
According to Justice
Brandeis, the operative question was “whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
53
competition.” This new rule of reason (the “Board Rule of Reason”)
54
reinvented the Section 1 analysis, eschewing the less restrictive
alternative inquiry and embracing a broad, multi-factored balancing
55
test.
Rather than anchoring the test on the necessity of the restraint, the
56
Court focused its gaze on the competitive effects of the restraint.
49. Id. at 65.
50. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
51. Id. at 179. Justice White first discussed the concept of a rule of reason in his
dissent in Trans-Missouri. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 355
(1897) (White, J., dissenting).
52. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, An Instrumental Theory of Market Power and
Antitrust Policy, 59 SMU L. REV. 1673, 1683–84 (2006) (providing examples of the
Court upholding restraints under the rule of reason approach that would have
constituted per se violations pre-Board).
55. Justice Brandeis explained that:
the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test[] as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is
of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or
the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.
Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
56. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 774 (1999) (examining
the restraint for a “net procompetitive effect” or a “net anticompetitive effect”); Nat’l
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The Board Rule of Reason seeks to answer a question that Addyston
did not raise—what is the net competitive effect of the restraint? The
Board Rule of Reason, therefore, requires courts to perform a costbenefit analysis of the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of a
restraint. The crucial question to be answered by Section 1 of the
Sherman Act is whether the procompetitive benefits of the restraint
57
in question outweigh its anticompetitive effects. If the restraint is
net procompetitive—that is, if the market is better off with the
58
restraint than without it—it is legal under the Sherman Act. Under
the Board Rule of Reason, there is no difference in legality between
an agreement that has a net procompetitive impact and an
agreement that has a greater net procompetitive impact. They are
both legal. A more efficient, or less restrictive alternative, is not
“more legal.” The relevant comparison is between the state of the
market with and without the restraint, not the state of the market
with the restraint and with a different restraint. Thus, a restraint is
only illegal if its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive
benefits.
This new rule of reason was attacked from the moment Justice
Brandeis penned the opinion and has been the subject of
59
unrelenting attack ever since. The test has been likened to, inter
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (stating that “the
inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition”); Reifert v. S. Cent.
Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 321 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Under the rule of reason,
[plaintiff] had the burden to demonstrate that [the restraint’s] net effect was anticompetitive.”); Viazis v. Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“If, by contrast, the restraint should be judged according to the rule of reason, its
net potential for competitive harm must be evaluated by weighing its probable
anticompetitive effects against any procompetitive benefits.”); Battle v. Lubrizol
Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[R]ule of reason analysis should be used
to determine the net effect on the market.”); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.,
629 F.2d 1351, 1367 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the purpose of the rule of reason is
to “assess . . . the net competitive impact of the practice”).
57. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The basic question is whether this, or some other, theoretically
redeeming [procompetitive benefit] in fact offsets the restrictions’ anticompetitive
effects . . . .”); see also, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 11 (explaining that under a
“consequential analysis . . . [i]f a restraint appears to have a net positive effect, or
even if it is on balance apparently neutral, then it is desirable or at least not unlawful.
If it has a net negative effect, it is undesirable”).
58. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104–05 (1984) (noting that the
relevant comparison for the Section 1 analysis is the competitive state of the market
with and without the restraint in question); see also, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS § 1.2, at 4 (April 2000),available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/
ftcdojguidelines.pdf (“Rule of reason analysis focuses on the state of competition
with, as compared to without, the relevant agreement.”).
59. Then-Professor Taft stated:
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60

alia, “the antitrust equivalent to Chinese water torture,” the “most
61
curious obiter dictum ever indulged in by the Supreme Court,” the
62
63
“Full Monty,” and a “blowfish.” One of the primary criticisms is
that the Board Rule of Reason replaced the clear principles of the
64
Addyston test with a muddled set of platitudes. It added ex ante
confusion and uncertainty and traded the relative simplicity and
predictability of the means-oriented Addyston test for an amorphous
balancing test that requires situation-specific factual inquiries. The
test requires courts to identify a variety of poorly defined (or
undefined), disparate and incommensurate factors, broadly labeled

[T]he phrase “the rule of reason” brought out the condemnation of
everybody of demagogic tendencies prominent in politics, and evoked from
statesmen of little general information and less law, proposals to amend the
statute, “to put teeth” into it, and to eliminate from the power of the court
the right to use the rule of reason in the construction and application of the
anti-trust law.
TAFT, supra note 13, at 94; see Comment, Negotiability and the Renvoi Doctrine, 27 YALE
L.J. 1046, 1061 (1918) (noting that “[t]he ‘rule of reason’ [was] much
misunderstood and much criticized when it was first announced”); Editorial, Restraint
of Trade: Board of Trade Rule Limiting Hours of Trade, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1156
(1918) (noting that the test announced in Chicago Board of Trade “may come back to
give trouble”); see also, e.g., Robert Dishman, Mr. Justice White and the Rule of Reason, 13
REV. OF POL. 229, 229 (1951) (“The ‘rule of reason’ remains after almost forty years
the most curious obiter dictum ever indulged in by the Supreme Court of the United
States.”); Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 913–14 (1985) (“The balancing process inherent in any rule of
reason analysis . . . at least as currently applied . . . produces a hopeless morass.”);
Roberts, supra note 41, at 999, 1000 (“In establishing the Rule of Reason, the Court
made a colossal blunder” because it “interpreted [the language of Section 1] as if
Congress was either illiterate or stupid for not saying what it intended.”).
Perhaps the most scathing attack of this approach came from Justice Harlan in his
dissenting opinion in American Tobacco, seven years before Chicago Board of Trade:
Let me say, also, that as we all agree that the combination in question was
illegal under any construction of the anti-trust act, there was not the slightest
necessity to enter upon an extended argument to show that the act of
Congress was to be read as if it contained the word ‘unreasonable’ or
‘undue.’ All that is said in the court’s opinion in support of that view is, I say
with respect, obiter dicta, pure and simple.
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 193 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
60. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.2d 457, 475-476 (6th Cir. 1992)
(quotation omitted).
61. Dishman, supra note 59, at 229.
62. Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the
Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000).
63. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
105 (2005).
64. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 40, at 93–94 (“With one bold stroke, the
Supreme Court cut the cord connecting then-undeveloped Sherman Act case law to
its most likely foundation in common law doctrine.”). But see BORK, supra note 27, at
34 (arguing that the early Supreme Court opinions addressing the Sherman Act were
“so thoroughly misunderstood that many people believed the Supreme Court had
subverted the Sherman Act”).
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And,
as “procompetitive benefits” and “anticompetitive effects.”
given the unyielding disagreement regarding the meaning of
“competition,” critics of the test argue that notions of procompetitive
and anticompetitive effects are widely divergent and virtually
66
impossible to identify.
Even if a court is able to identify the procompetitive benefits and
anticompetitive effects of the agreement, the test gives no real
guidance as to how these two core values should be balanced and
67
weighed. There is also general skepticism about the ability of judges
or juries to balance different competitive effects with any real
65. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 59, at 905 (“[E]fficiencies are difficult to
quantify, and even more difficult to ‘trade off’ against anticompetitive effects.”);
Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 391,
393 n.12 (2000) (discussing difficulties in applying the Chicago Board of Trade
balancing test).
66. The various schools of thought hold widely different opinions on the
definition of competition. For example, some focus solely on notions of allocative
efficiency and promotion of consumer welfare. Others key on concepts of
distribution of wealth, others put the greatest weight on the existence of “free”
markets, some still cling to populist ideals. The only real consensus is that there is no
consensus regarding the definition of competition and the goals of antitrust law. See,
e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 368 (2000) (explaining Judge Posner’s
characterization of three competing positions); Kauper, supra note 38, at 896
(explaining various opposing opinions on the goals of antitrust law). For more
detailed discussions of the debate and disagreement regarding the definitions of
competition, see, e.g., William F. Baxter, who wrote that
After close to a century of antitrust jurisprudence, a vigorous debate
continues over the proper means of furthering the original congressional
goals of competition and free enterprise. As a result, uncertainty remains
over the measure against which the social desirability (and hence legality) of
various types of business conduct should be tested.
William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law”
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (1982) (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2730 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in
which the benefits are likely to outweigh potential harms? My own answer is, not very
easily.”); see also, e.g., Arthur, supra note 44, at 1193–94 (noting that the Court has not
explained what is necessary to establish an anticompetitive effect or a procompetitive
benefit); Harvey J. Goldschmid, Horizontal Restraints in Antitrust: Current Treatment
and Future Needs, 75 CAL. L. REV. 925, 926 (1987) (concluding that the rule of reason
is “simply unworkable”). The 1913 Report of the Senate Interstate Commerce
Committee illustrates the early criticism leveled at the rule of reason:
It is inconceivable that in a country governed by a written constitution and
statute law the courts can be permitted to test each restraint of trade by the
economic standard which the individual members of the court may happen
to approve . . . . In the end nine justices of the Supreme Court will be asked
to say whether the restraint of trade brought about through this combination
is a due or an undue restraint, and the answer which each justice makes to
that question will depend upon his individual opinion as an economist or
sociologist, the conclusion of the court being in substance an act of
legislation passed by the judicial branch of the Government to fit a particular
case.
S. REP. No. 1326, (1913), as reprinted in 49 CONG. REC. 4126, 4129 (1913).
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As Justice Scalia has noted, balancing
accuracy or consistency.
incommensurate values, such as procompetitive benefits and
anticompetitive effects, is the equivalent of “judging whether a
69
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” The test is
therefore attacked for complicating and elongating the litigation
process and requiring judges to engage in ex post policymaking
isolated from any clear ex ante standards.
The criticisms are summed up well by Professor Hovenkamp:
Justice Brandeis’s version of the rule of reason created one of the
most costly procedures in antitrust practice. Under it courts have
engaged in unfocused, wide-ranging expeditions into practically
everything about the business of large firms in order to determine
whether a challenged practice was unlawful. Justice Brandeis’s
celebrated statement never defines what it is that courts are
supposed to look for. His distinction between a restraint that
“merely regulates” or “promotes” competition and those that “may
suppress or even destroy” it can expand and contract like a
70
blowfish, meaning almost anything at all.

68. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–41 (1978)
(holding that “the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to
distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable
business conduct”); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972)
(noting that “courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229–30
n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Weighing [competitive] effects in any direct sense will usually
be beyond judicial capabilities.”); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 108
(“Meaningful balancing, which involves placing cardinal values on both sides of a
scale and determining which is heavier, is virtually never possible. A court will rarely
be in a position to compute a number that measures the social cost of any market
power being exercised, and then another number that measures claimed benefits,
and net them out.”); Carrier, supra note 38, at 1349 (“Like it or not, balancing is with
us. And as long as we do not expect mathematical precision—which, in any event, is
impossible—balancing is not necessarily a bad thing.”); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1978)
(“[T]here is no reliable way in which a balance of this sort can be made.”).
69. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
70. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 105; see also id. at 149 (noting that under the
Chicago Board of Trade analysis, “one dumps every scrap of information available about
an industry onto a large table and then tries to sort out the positives and negatives”);
LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 188 (1977) (remarking
that the rule of reason analysis “must be referred to the arts rather than the sciences
of judgment”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12
(1984) (“Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require. When
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.”); Posner, supra note 4, at 15
(commenting that the rule of reason is “[a] standard so poorly articulated and
particularized, applied by tribunals so poorly equipped to understand and apply it”);
Roberts, supra note 41, at 998 (“[I]n 1911 the Supreme Court led antitrust . . . into
the twilight zone with its announcement of the ‘Rule of Reason’ in Standard
Oil . . . .”).
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In short, critics contend that the test asks courts to identify the
unidentifiable and balance the unbalanceable.
Much of this criticism, however, at least in terms of the modern
application of the Board Rule of Reason, may be overstated because
courts are rarely required to perform a real or precise balancing test
when applying the rule of reason. Rather, in nearly all cases, the
competitive effects are overwhelmingly net pro- or anticompetitive, or
one of the parties has failed to allege any pro- or anticompetitive
71
effects at all. Additionally, a weakness of the balancing test may be
the inability of judges and scholars to agree on the goals of the
antitrust laws and the meaning of competition. The real flaw in the
Board Rule of Reason may be a flaw that is inherent in all of antitrust
analysis, particularly any analysis that requires a tangible definition of
competition as well as measurable and observable indicia of
72
competitive effects.
Regardless of the validity and persistence of criticism and calls for
73
reform, the Supreme Court has yet to veer from the Board Rule of
71. The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229
(2d Cir. 2003), is illustrative of the typical rule of reason case. In Visa, the court
invalidated the restraint at issue under the rule of reason after identifying the
restraint’s anticompetitive effects and noting that there was “no evidence” of
countervailing procompetitive benefits. Id. at 243; see also, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v.
FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (invaliding a restriction under the rule of
reason after holding the defendant had not proved that the restriction produced any
procompetitive benefits).
As Professor Michael Carrier has comprehensively explained, the overwhelming
majority of rule of reason cases are disposed of because one side puts forth no
evidence of valid anticompetitive or procompetitive effects. Carrier, supra note 38, at
1322; see also, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 107 (“Hopefully, few cases will
require real balancing . . . .”); Phillip Areeda, A Second Century of the Rule of Reason, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 143, 149 (1990) (“In practice, courts undertake a rough qualitative
balancing, asking whether any one element stands out as predominant.”); Arthur,
supra note 66, at 367 (criticizing the balancing test but noting that “courts avoid
actual balancing”); Pitofsky, supra note 59, at 914 (noting that precise balancing is
unnecessary in many cases decided under the rule of reason); Lawrence A. Sullivan,
The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 835, 838 (1987)
(noting that with National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978), “a real structure was imposed on the undisciplined shopping list—nature of
the business, history of the restraint, and all the rest—that Justice Brandeis had
tendered to juries in [Chicago] Board of Trade v. United States.”).
72. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 71, at 841 (“[M]uch of the disagreement about
the meaning and significance of particular [antitrust] cases is traceable not to
differences in either perception or analysis, but to different value choices.”); see also
supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the
Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 271 (1986) (proposing that the
Chicago Board of Trade rule of reason be replaced with an Addyston-type analysis);
Donald L. Beschle, “What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an
Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 474–75 (1987) (noting that
“the indefinite nature of [the rule of reason] . . . has led to persistent calls for more
precise and stringent rules”).
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Reason. Repeatedly, the Court has made clear that the Board Rule
of Reason is the proper test and that the role of antitrust law is to act
as a gatekeeper, ferreting out net anticompetitive activity. Certain
categories of agreements are inherently anticompetitive and so likely
to have a net anticompetitive impact that they are considered per se
75
For all
illegal and are condemned without any further analysis.
other agreements, the Sherman Act requires courts to apply the Board
Rule of Reason to determine the net competitive effect of an
76
agreement by balancing its pro- and anticompetitive effects. If the
effects of the agreement are net procompetitive, the analysis is over
77
and the restraint is legal. The “reasonably necessary” test articulated
in Addyston and the search for less restrictive alternatives disappeared
from rule of reason analysis, as the inquiry was irrelevant to the
determination of net competitive effects. No court even mentioned
the less restrictive alternative test in the rule of reason context the
78
first forty years after Chicago Board of Trade was published in 1918.
The test, which served as the foundation of the Addyston Rule of
Reason and common law restraint of trade jurisprudence, had
vanished.
C. Rebirth of the Less Restrictive Alternative Test
After Chicago Board of Trade, the less restrictive alternative test
emerged in three different antitrust contexts, none of which provides
support for its current use by federal circuit courts in the rule of
reason. The Supreme Court first used the test as part of the
79
determination of the per se illegality of tying arrangements. A tying
74. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713
(2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“The contours of the traditional rule of reason inquiry have remained largely
unchanged since they were first defined in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States . . . .”); BORK, supra note 27, at 43 (Chicago Board of Trade is “often quoted as the
quintessential expression of the rule of reason”).
75. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining that
the “principle of per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation . . . to determine at large
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly
fruitless when undertaken”).
76. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720 (commenting that the rule of reason “is
designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the market”); see
also discussion supra notes 56–58.
78. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The one
exception being Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). See
discussion supra note 47; see also Thomas Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust
Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 928 (1999) (“For nearly eighty
years, the federal courts neglected Judge Taft’s approach.”).
79. Int’l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); see IBM Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138 (1936) (discussing the relevance of less restrictive
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arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product (the
“tying product”) only on the condition that the buyer also purchases
a different product (the “tied product”). Tying violations are an
anomaly in Sherman Act jurisprudence. Unlike the traditional
categories of per se violations—price fixing, group boycotts, and
horizontal market divisions—tying arrangements are subject to a
80
quasi-per se rule. Under the traditional per se approach, proof of
the agreement itself leads to an irrebuttable presumption of illegality,
under the theory that the given type of agreement—price fixing,
etc.—is inherently net anticompetitive and thus would always violate
the rule of reason. The per se classification merely serves as a judicial
shortcut.
The per se test is applied with less rigidity in tying cases, as proof of
the tying agreement leads only to a rebuttable presumption of
illegality. If the defendant can prove both that the tying arrangement
serves some procompetitive purpose and that the tying arrangement
is the least restrictive method for achieving the procompetitive
purpose, the tying arrangement is subject to the traditional Board
81
82
Rule of Reason. Otherwise, the tying agreement is per se illegal.
As Professor Donald Turner explained in his influential analysis of
tying violations, “[a] per se rule is clearly justified if . . . the other
interests can be equally well or nearly as well served by less restrictive
83
devices.” The less restrictive alternative inquiry is thus to soften and
provide an exception to the otherwise rigid per se rule, but not as a

alternatives). One of the first tying cases to explicitly address the less restrictive
alternative was United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 561 (E.D. Pa.
1960). For an early and influential discussion of the less restrictive alternative in
tying cases, see Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958) [hereinafter Validity] and Donald F. Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paralellism and Refusals to Deal,
75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
80. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (noting that
“while the Court has spoken of a ‘per se’ rule against tying arrangements, it has also
recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications that make it
inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis”).
81. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)
(holding that tying arrangements are per se illegal “because [they] generally serve[]
no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way”).
For a comprehensive discussion of the use of less restrictive alternatives in the tying
analysis, see Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the
Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17–22 (1997).
82. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1349–50
(9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the relevance of the less restrictive alternative inquiry in
tying cases); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971)
(determining that specification should be used because it is a less restrictive
alternative than restraint of trade).
83. Turner, Validity, supra note 79, at 59.
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84

If the tie avoids per se
part of the rule of reason analysis.
condemnation, however, the application of the rule of reason
remains the same—a court balances the procompetitive benefits and
85
anticompetitive effects of a restraint to determine its net effects.
The inquiry then emerged in the rule of reason context for the
first time in 1963 in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in White Motor Co.
86
v. United States. In White Motor, the Supreme Court addressed the
87
In oral
legality of vertical territorial and customer restrictions.
argument before the Supreme Court, the Government argued for a
return of the Addyston focus on less restrictive alternatives, claiming
that territorial and customer restrictions should be illegal per se
because, inter alia, primary responsibility clauses were less restrictive
88
alternatives for achieving the same procompetitive objectives. The
majority rejected the per se illegal characterization of the restrictions
84. Proof of the presence of a less restrictive alternative typically indicates that
the tied sale was forced on the purchaser, and thus is inherently anticompetitive. See
id. at 64 (noting that “[s]ince a tying arrangement in the vast majority of cases
performs no useful function that cannot be performed by less restrictive courses of
action, it is quite reasonable to presume an illegal purpose, and some power over the
typing product, from the mere fact that tie-ins were used”).
85. The Supreme Court has also allowed a defendant to use the absence of less
restrictive alternatives to avoid per se condemnation in other antitrust cases. See, e.g.,
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979) (disagreeing with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that blanket licenses are per se illegal).
86. 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Interestingly, the least
restrictive alternative test emerged as an integral part of constitutional scrutiny
during this time period in strict scrutiny cases, particularly in regulations implicating
civil rights. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). Justice Brennan authored several of these opinions. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“Precision of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”); infra
notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
87. In White Motor, the defendant had entered into vertical agreements that, inter
alia, restricted the geographic areas within which distributors and dealers were
permitted to sell trucks and parts, restricted the customers to whom distributors and
dealers were permitted to sell trucks for resale, and fixed the resale price for trucks
and parts sold by distributors to dealers for retail sale. White Motor, 372 U.S. at 255–
56.
88. Id. at 266–67; see Charles E. Stewart, Jr., Exclusive Franchises and Territorial
Confinement of Distributors, 22 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST L. 33, 41 (1963) (observing
that the “[g]overnment strongly pressed the contention that the primary
responsibility arrangement was a less restrictive alternative to territorial confinement,
and adequately served the legitimate business needs of White [Motor]”). Three
years later, Donald Turner, in his role as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, wrote a short piece for the New York Bar Association where he
argued on behalf of the government that vertical territorial restrictions should be per
se illegal, with limited exception, because less restrictive alternatives exist that
adequately achieve the same legitimate goals. Turner, supra note 41. As Turner
explained, “[M]y tentative view is that territorial restrictions on dealers are more
restrictive than is necessary to obtain legitimate objectives in all but very limited
circumstances. There are ample alternative devices, all less restrictive than territorial
restraints, whereby a manufacturer can attempt to achieve an efficient, aggressive
marketing system.” Id. at 6.
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because of the uncertainty of the impact of such restraints, and
ignored the government’s arguments regarding less restrictive
89
alternatives. Instead, the Court held that the traditional Board Rule
of Reason should apply to determine the net competitive effects of
90
the restraint.
In his concurrence, however, Justice Brennan argued that the less
restrictive alternative inquiry was “pertinent” to the rule of reason
inquiry because the role of the court is not only to determine if the
defendant has a procompetitive justification for its restraint, “but
whether the restraint so justified is more restrictive than necessary, or
excessively anticompetitive, when viewed in light of the extenuating
91
Justice Brennan then clarified the significance of the
interests.”
proof of less restrictive alternatives: “its presence invites suspicion
either that dealer pressures rather than manufacturer interests
brought it about, or that the real purpose of its adoption was to
92
restrict price competition.” In other words, as discussed below, the
inquiry was used to shed light on the intent or purpose of the
agreement.
93
Later that year, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, the Supreme
Court used the Addyston-style less restrictive alternative inquiry in its
third different context as part of a very specialized rule of reason to
determine the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to
94
In Silver, the New York Stock
federally regulated agencies.
Exchange denied non-member brokers access to wire service
facilities, arguing that federal securities laws provided them with an
95
implied, qualified immunity from antitrust scrutiny. The Supreme
Court invalidated the restriction, holding that antitrust immunity is
“implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work,
96
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.”
Courts
subsequently used the holding in Silver to create a new “rule of
reason” that incorporated a number of factors, including, inter alia, a
consideration of whether the regulation at issue was “no more
97
extensive than necessary.” Use of this rule of reason, however, has
89. White Motor, 372 U.S. at 261.
90. Id. at 263–64.
91. Id. at 271, 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 270 n.9.
93. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
94. See id. at 364 (concluding that the actions of the Stock Exchange violated the
Sherman Act).
95. Id. at 344.
96. Id. at 357.
97. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1116
(D. Neb. 1981); see, e.g., Neeld v. Nat’l Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir.
1979) (affirming the dismissal of a one-eyed hockey player’s Sherman Act claim
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been limited to discrete situations where a federal agency is
statutorily authorized to regulate an industry, thereby making it all
98
Significantly, courts have made clear that the
but disappear.
additional factors in the Silver test, such as the search for less
restrictive alternatives, are relevant to the legality of the exercise of
statutory authority, not to the legality of the restraint under antitrust
99
law.
Soon after the emergence of the less restrictive alternative inquiry
in these contexts, each of the federal circuits gradually adopted the
inquiry as an independent and dispositive prong of the rule of
100
reason, and the new test quickly began to receive widespread
101
scholarly support. This transformation occurred despite the limited
against the National Hockey League because the primary purpose of the League’s bylaw excluding one-eyed players was safety, rather than anticompetitiveness); Hatley v.
Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming the lower
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s antitrust claim by declining to apply a per se rule that
would have deemed defendant’s refusal to register plaintiff’s colt a group boycott in
violation of the Sherman Act); Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1121 (dismissing the
antitrust claim of a manufacturer of double-string tennis rackets in part because “the
temporary freeze on the use of double-strung rackets in sanctioned play was no more
extensive than necessary to further the legitimate goal of conducting the game in an
orderly fashion”). Other factors included the presence of procedural safeguards. Id.
at 1116.
98. See, e.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 147
(2d Cir. 2003) (describing the limited role of the Silver rule of reason); Behagen v.
Amateur Basketball Ass’n of the U.S., 884 F.2d 524, 527 (10th Cir. 1989)
(immunizing the actions of the United States Olympic Committee from antitrust
scrutiny because they “were clearly within the scope of activity directed by Congress,
and were necessary to implement Congress’ intent with regard to the governance of
amateur athletics”).
99. For instance, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Court held that
A plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present a threshold case
that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly
anticompetitive effects. The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal
does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to deal are predominantly
anticompetitive. When the plaintiff challenges expulsion from a joint buying
cooperative, some showing must be made that the cooperative possesses
market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective
competition.
Id. at 298.
100. See Grewe, supra note 12, at 236–45 (discussing the rule of reason standards
used by each circuit); Robert Pitofsky, Panel Discussion, Antitrust Counseling in an Era
of Change: Conflict Between Enforcement Policy and Case Law, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 50, 59
(1982) (noting that “[n]inety years of history indicates that [the less restrictive
alternative] question itself is a part of the rule of reason”); infra notes 106–122 and
accompanying text (identifying the burden of proof in each circuit).
101. See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 38, at 10 (explaining the benefits of a less
restrictive alternative over a least restrictive alternative test); Kauper, supra note 38, at
909 (“Society should not bear the costs of anticompetitive conduct in the name of
efficiency if it can have the efficiency without the adverse competitive effects.”);
Pitofsky, supra note 100, at 59 (“There is nothing wrong, in a rule of reason analysis,
with someone asking whether there is a significantly less restrictive alternative.”);
Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust
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use of the inquiry in Justice Brennan’s White Motor concurrence, the
narrow application of the Silver doctrine, and the fact that the
Supreme Court never even suggested veering from the Board Rule of
Reason and its focus on net competitive effects. Surprisingly, courts
and commentators typically incorporated the less restrictive inquiry
102
It
without citation or with just a general citation to White Motor.
eventually became a standard part of a new rule of reason test (the
“New Rule of Reason”) used by the lower courts.
Pursuant to this new rule of reason, courts must apply both the
Board Rule of Reason and the Addyston Rule of Reason. First, courts
apply the balancing test from Board of Trade. If the procompetitive
benefits of the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects, the
court must then apply the less restrictive alternative test from
Addyston. Under this New Rule of Reason, a restraint can only survive
if it is net procompetitive and if the procompetitive benefits could not
103
have been achieved in a less restrictive manner. As the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained,
establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps.
First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition
as a whole on the relevant market. Then, if the plaintiff succeeds,
the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive
redeeming virtues of the action. Should the defendant carry this
Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 525 (1997) (“NCAA also reflects the long tradition in
antitrust law that proscribes overly restrictive agreements among rivals, even when
they have legitimate reasons to combine their economic activities.”); Sullivan, supra
note 71, at 851 (stating that “even if . . . claimed efficiencies are real and significant,
if they can be substantially obtained by means significantly less threatening to
competition,” then the restraint violates the rule of reason); Wirtz, supra note 38, at
32 (concluding that “the public interest lies in securing [procompetitive benefits] at
the least possible sacrifice. A restraint that confers certain benefits at the cost of
unnecessary injury to competition can fairly be said to be, to the extent of that
unnecessary injury, ‘unreasonable.’”).
Surprisingly, most discussions of the less restrictive alternative inquiry in the rule
of reason simply assume that the inquiry is a basic and important part of the test,
without any real explanation as to how and why it became a part of the test. See, e.g.,
Martin B. Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints after Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment,
76 MICH. L. REV. 265, 272 n.44 (1977) (“The availability of less restrictive alternatives
has always been a basic consideration under the rule of reason, as Justice Brennan
carefully noted in his concurring opinion in White Motor.”).
102. See, e.g., John L. Murchison, Jr., Patent Acquisitions and the Antitrust Laws, 45
TEX. L. REV. 663, 685 (1967) (briefly referencing White Motor in explaining that the
rule of reason requires a balancing of competitive benefits and an examination of
less restrictive alternatives).
103. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of
Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 653 n.30 (2003)
(“[I]f the defendants had a practical ‘less restrictive alternative’ for achieving the
procompetitive benefits at less threat of harm to competition, the conduct would be
found unreasonable regardless of the relative magnitude of the benefits and
harms.”).
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burden [of proving that the restraint is net procompetitive], the plaintiff
must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved
104
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.

There is no uniformity in the application or even statement of the
test, either across or within the federal circuits. Instead, confusion
and inconsistency permeate the decisions. The two most significant
variables in the test are the level of requisite “restrictiveness” and the
burden of persuasion. With respect to the burden of persuasion, the
majority of the circuits place the burden on the plaintiff to prove the
105
existence of a less restrictive alternative.
The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Seventh Circuit,
however, place the burden on the defendant to prove the absence of
106
less restrictive alternatives, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Eleventh and Second Circuits have been inconsistent, placing the
107
burden on the defendant in one case and the plaintiff in another.
The level of restrictiveness varies from “least restrictive” to
108
“reasonably necessary.”

104. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quotations omitted) (citations and formatting omitted) (emphasis added); see also,
e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 59, at 913 (“A rule of reason analysis means balancing
anticompetitive effects against efficiencies and other business justifications, and then
examining whether comparable efficiencies could have been achieved in a less
restrictive way.”).
105. This burden is best demonstrated by United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d
658 (3d Cir. 1993), which stated that
[i]f a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of
market power or actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective. A restraint on competition cannot be justified solely
on the basis of social welfare concerns. To rebut, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
stated objective.
Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
106. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 363 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
lower court’s finding that the defendant AMA did not meet its burden of proof);
Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(concluding that “because the [defendant] has failed to demonstrate that the limited
practice requirement is the least restrictive method available to achieve the asserted
goal it is, at this stage of the proceeding, an insufficient justification for a practice
that in other respects has an anticompetitive potential—albeit minimal”) (footnote
omitted).
107. Compare Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1983) (noting that defendant may show that the “restraints were reasonably
necessary to achieve legitimate, pro-competitive purposes”), with Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated
objective”).
108. See infra notes 109–122 and accompanying text (comparing the varying
degrees of proof required by the federal circuits).
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The D.C. Circuit employs the most extreme version of the test, as
109
illustrated in Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, placing
the burden on the defendant to show that the restraint employed was
the least restrictive alternative, regardless of the net effects of the
110
restraint.
In Kreuzer, a periodontist brought a Section 1 claim
against the American Academy of Periodontology’s (“AAP”) “limited
practice requirement,” which prevented members from performing
111
non-periodontic services.
The district court granted summary
judgment for the AAP, concluding that the AAP had no
112
anticompetitive intent in implementing the restriction.
The D.C.
Circuit reversed based on the court’s failure to consider the
competitive effects of the restraint, and remanded the case,
113
instructing the district court to apply the New Rule of Reason. The
D.C. Circuit stated that the defendant had to show that its restriction
was net procompetitive and that it was the “least restrictive means of
114
achieving the desired goal,” even where the procompetitive benefits
of the restriction are clear and the anticompetitive effects are
115
minimal.
116
The Second Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
117
Circuit employ a similar test, but shift the burden to the plaintiff to
109. 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
110. Id. at 1495; see also Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187–88 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (concluding that the draft offered by the defendant was not the least
restrictive restraint on trade).
111. Kreuzer, 735 F.2d at 1482.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1495–96.
114. Id. at 1496 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 1494–95.
116. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that the plaintiff must first show that the challenged action had an actual
adverse effect on competition as a whole. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant
to show that the action has procompetitive benefit. If the defendant succeeds, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the same procompetitive benefit
could have been achieved through less restrictive means); K.M.B. Warehouse
Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff if the defendant can show that the contested
action has procompetitive benefits). The Second Circuit has been inconsistent in its
approach. In an earlier case, the Second Circuit “agree[d] with the Third Circuit
that a better charge would be to require that ‘the restraints . . . not exceed the limits
reasonably necessary to meet the competitive problems’” and suggested that the
inquiry was not a dispositive factor in the analysis. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1320, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975) (emphasis omitted)).
However, the Second Circuit later held that the defendant had “to come forward
with proof that any legitimate purposes could not be achieved through less restrictive
means.” N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261 (2d
Cir. 1982).
117. See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 510–11 (4th Cir.
2002) (remanding to the district court with instructions to more carefully scrutinize
the presumption in favor of procompetitive justifications); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v.
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show that the “same pro-competitive effect could be achieved
118
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.”
While the shift removes the burden from the defendant, the test still
permits a court to invalidate a restraint if it is not the least restrictive
alternative available to the defendant. The Third and Eleventh
Circuits place the burden on the plaintiff to show that the restraint
119
120
was not “fairly necessary”
or “not reasonably necessary”
to
121
The Sixth, Eighth and
accomplish the procompetitive benefits.
Ninth Circuits all place a more demanding burden on the plaintiff,
requiring it to show that any legitimate goals can be achieved by the
122
defendant in a “substantially less restrictive manner.”
Regardless of the specific version of the New Rule of Reason, the
general inquiry marked a dramatic shift in antitrust analysis because
it reintroduced the narrow tailoring requirement of Addyston into the
rule of reason. Under the Board test, a restraint is legal as long as its
effects are net procompetitive, meaning the market must be better
off with the restraint than it would have been without the restraint.
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1041–42 (4th Cir. 1987) (denying
MBNA’s motions for a directed verdict and judgment because MBNA failed to
establish that its replacement parts tie-in was the least restrictive method of avoiding
groundless warranty claims).
118. Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 56 (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127). The
First and Fifth Circuits have articulated a similar test but do not indicate who bears
the burden of persuasion. See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103
(1st Cir. 1994) (“One basic tenet of the rule of reason is that a given restriction is not
reasonable, that is, its benefits cannot outweigh its harm to competition, if a
reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the policy exists that would provide the same
benefits as the current restraint.”); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506
F.2d 934, 945 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The question whether there exists an alternative
less destructive of competition than the restrictions imposed by [the defendant] in
this case is, of course, a proper inquiry under the traditional rule of reason
analysis.”).
119. Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1248.
120. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005); see also,
e.g., Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“Rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff to prove (1) an anticompetitive effect
of the defendant’s conduct on the relevant market, and (2) that the conduct has no
procompetitive benefit or justification.”).
121. The Third and Eleventh Circuits assert that their tests do not require proof
that the restraint was the “least restrictive alternative.” Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at
1248.
122. Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1012 (6th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey
Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003)); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d
1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996); Flegel v. Christian Hosps. Ne.–Nw., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991));
Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling in favor of Blue
Cross in part because the plaintiffs did not sufficiently demonstrate the existence of a
viable alternative). Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice only consider procompetitive benefits that could not have been achieved “by
practical, significantly less restrictive means.” FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, § 3.36(b), at 24.
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Under the new test, a net procompetitive effect is not sufficient.
123
Instead, it must be the most net procompetitive restraint possible,
meaning the market must be better off with the restraint than it
would have been with other restraints. The New Rule of Reason thus
requires courts to narrowly tailor conduct that the Board Rule of
Reason has already determined to be legal. This approach is both
124
theoretically and practically flawed.
II. THEORETICAL FLAWS OF A DISPOSITIVE LESS RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE INQUIRY
Proponents of the less restrictive alternative test argue that it is
superior to the Chicago Board of Trade balancing test because it is
easier to perform, less expensive, and leads to more predictable
125
results.
These arguments, however, lend no support to the New
Rule of Reason because that test combines both the Board balancing
test and the less restrictive alternative test. It is therefore more
difficult to perform, costlier, and less predictable. Even if used as the
exclusive test, however, the search for less restrictive alternatives is
fundamentally flawed, because it does not answer the basic question
raised by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Chicago Board of Trade and every Supreme Court decision that
follows makes clear that antitrust law requires a determination of the
net competitive effect of a restraint by comparing the state of
competition before (or without) the restraint versus after (or with)
126
the restraint. The purpose of Section 1 and the rule of reason is “to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
127
Thus, the question courts must answer is: does the
restraint.”
128
restraint promote or destroy competition?
In other words, is the
restraint net pro- or anticompetitive? Despite the unrelenting
criticisms leveled at the Board Rule of Reason over the last century,
123. The standard in the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits is, however, at least in
theory, less demanding. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124. These flaws are amplified with the more extreme variations of the test, such
as that used by the D.C. Circuit, where the chosen restraint must the “least
restrictive” alternative or the alternatives must only be slightly less restrictive. See
supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
125. Cf. infra Part IV (explaining the disadvantages of the less restrictive
alternatives test).
126. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (explaining that
the Court’s inquiry is whether the challenged restraint enhances competition); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that the
rule of reason inquiry focuses directly on a challenged restraint’s impact on
competition).
127. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692).
128. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (establishing the rule of reason
test focuses on a restraint’s competitive effect on the market).
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this underlying question and the basic purpose of the antitrust laws
has never been modified by the Supreme Court since the inception
129
of Chicago Board of Trade in 1918.
The basic flaw of the use of the less restrictive alternative as an
additional dispositive prong of the rule of reason is that it changes
the fundamental purpose of the Section 1 analysis and divorces itself
from the mission of Chicago Board of Trade by comparing the state of
competition after (or with) the restraint with the state of competition
with alternative restraints. This inquiry may tell us if the challenged
restraint is more or less efficient than its alternatives, but it does not
measure the net effect of the restraint and therefore avoids the
fundamental question raised by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board
130
of Trade. A restraint that is not as effective as available alternatives
may be direct evidence of a bad business decision, but it is not
evidence of net anticompetitive effect.
The role of antitrust law is not to fix imperfections, but rather to
131
The less restrictive
ensure a satisfactory level of performance.
alternative inquiry, however, provides an invitation for plaintiffs to
challenge and courts to examine every business decision made by a
firm. Once a court makes a determination of the net competitive
effect of a restraint, the role of antitrust law is complete. If the
restraint is net anticompetitive, it is illegal. If it is net procompetitive,
it is legal, and nothing more than a business decision made by a firm
or group of firms. Interference by a court after a restraint is
determined to be net procompetitive is no different and no less
inappropriate than judicial regulation of any other business
132
decision. Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry thus changes
129. Bd. Of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (proclaiming
that “[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition”).
130. Id.
131. As one economist has noted:
The antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement institutions are not designed or
well suited to identify and ‘fix’ all market imperfections that lead markets to
depart from textbook models of perfect competition. Neither the state of
economic science, nor the capabilities of public and private policy
enforcement institutions, would make it feasible or desirable for antitrust
policy to seek to identify a wide range of market imperfections, and
associated firm behavior and market structures, and then to evaluate each
case to determine whether some way can be found to improve economic
efficiency by changing the structure of the market or constraining firm
behavior.
Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 95, 98 (Apr. 2002).
132. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 2127 S. Ct.
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the role of Section 1 from an ex ante deterrent of anticompetitive
behavior to an ex post, ad hoc regulator and micro-manager of
133
Putting aside (for a moment)
procompetitive business decisions.
the fact that courts are not equipped to second-guess business
judgments, the inquiry fundamentally changes the rule of reason and
134
coverts it from a “satisficing” test to a “maximizing” test. This
change conflicts with both the basic purpose of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and notions of judicial efficiency that underlie antitrust
law.
A. Maximizing Versus Satisficing
A maximizing test “selects the best alternative from among all those
135
available.” The less restrictive alternative inquiry is a quintessential
2705 (2007) (“I think that at least it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial
policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground
for interference is very clear.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Once it is clear that
restraints can only be intended to enhance efficiency rather than to restrict output,
the degree of restraint is a matter of business rather than legal judgment.”); Foster v.
Md. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that
defendant’s failure to use allegedly less restrictive alternatives was a “legitimate
exercise of business judgment that is outside the scope of the antitrust laws”). As
Professor Bork explained:
For a court to strike down, for example, a vertical market division on the
theory that the manufacturer had made a mistake as to the most efficient
mode of distribution would be equivalent to judicial supervision of any other
normal business judgment.
The court might as well second-guess
management’s judgment on assembly line planning, inventory policy,
product design or any of the other decisions that affect efficiency. Whatever
else it is, the Sherman Act is not a device for imposing upon the entire
economy, or any aspect of the economy’s behavior, a judicial form of public
utility regulation.
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 404 (1965). Or, as Milton Handler wrote:
But what about the business man? Why should he be required to
experiment with less restrictive (and possibly less effective and less practical)
alternatives on pain of incurring severe antitrust liability? Why should he be
second-guessed by economic theoreticians because he has elected to cope
with his distribution problems in a business-like manner, selecting the
arrangements which promise to be most effective from a business point of
view?
Milton Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking—Nineteenth Annual
Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92, 124 (1966); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text .
133. Cf. Bork, supra note 27, at 26 (observing that permitting a reasonable price
defense in price fixing cases would put courts in the impossible position of “allowing
cartels but policing their prices and behavior”).
134. The concept of a “satisficing” model is attributed to Herbert A. Simon. The
model is consistent with the theory of bounded rationality. Paul Mosley, Towards a
“Satisficing” Theory of Economic Policy, 86 ECON. J., Mar. 1976, at 59, 60; Herbert A.
Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV., Sept.
1979, at 493 (1979).
135. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION xxix (3d ed. 1976).
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maximizing test because it seeks to achieve the most efficient method
for accomplishing the procompetitive benefits of a restraint. As
discussed above, use of this maximizing test in the Addyston analysis
was essential because it served as the only check on the
136
anticompetitiveness of a restraint.
A satisficing test, however, “looks for a course of action that is
137
satisfactory or ‘good enough,’” and only has two outcomes—“good
138
enough and not good enough.” A satisficing test factors in the costs
and probability of achieving perfection and settles for a less-than139
ideal outcome. Significantly, the sub-optimal result is “satisfactory,”
or “good enough,” not solely because of the costs of achieving
perfection, but also because of the recognition—due to incomplete
or unavailable information and information-processing constraints—
140
As one
that the optimal result is likely impossible to achieve.
scholar has put it, the “difference between satisficing and
[maximizing] . . . is the difference between searching for the sharpest
needle in the haystack and searching for a needle that is sharp
141
enough for sewing.”
The Board Rule of Reason is by design, if not necessity, a satisficing
test because an agreement that is net procompetitive is “good
enough” while an agreement that is net anticompetitive is “not good

136. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining the role that the search
for the less restrictive alternative played in the Addyston Rule of Reason test when
determining the legality of the restraint).
137. Tom & Pak, supra note 65, at 394.
138. Mosley, supra note 134, at 60. According to Herbert Simon, under the
satisficing model, a decision maker forms “some aspiration as to how good an
alternative he should find. As soon as he discovered an alternative for choice
meeting his level of aspiration, he would terminate the search and choose that
alternative.” Simon, supra note 134, at 503; see also, e.g., SIMON, supra note 135, at
xxix (noting that some “[e]xamples of satisficing criteria, familiar enough to
businessmen if unfamiliar to most economists, are ‘share of market,’ ‘ adequate
profit,’ [and] ‘fair price’”).
139. See Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An
Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1984) (highlighting that limited options,
time constraints, or basic routines save individuals deliberation time, leading them to
choose imperfect but satisfactory options).
140. See Simon, supra note 134, at 503 (“[T]he important thing about the . . .
satisficing theory is that it showed how choice could actually be made with reasonable
amounts of calculation, and using very incomplete information, without the need of
performing the impossible—of carrying out [an] optimizing procedure.”); see also,
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 71, at 865 (“Rationality is bounded and information is often
costly, asymmetrically distributed, inaccurate, or simply unavailable.”); David Ward,
The Role of Satisficing in Foraging Theory, 63 OIKOS 312, 313 (1992) (offering the
analogy, in the ecological context, of a predator searching for prey being forced by
limited time and information to choose a less-than-ideal hunting strategy).
141. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1078 (2000).
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142

enough.” Once the threshold of “good enough” is met, the inquiry
is over. The test embeds notions of judicial and administrative
efficiency and recognizes the limits of antitrust analysis and economic
143
144
theory and the costs of complying with a rigid maximizing test.
The Board satisficing test does not seek to achieve the most efficient
or “best” economic outcome or the “perfect” result, because such a
result is costly to achieve and difficult to identify. Rather, the test
only seeks to ensure that the market is better off with the restraint
145
than without it. The antitrust laws encourage firms to be innovative
and creative in their quest to survive in competitive markets, so long
146
as their creativity and innovation have a net procompetitive impact.
Once this satisfactory result is met, the law is willing to sacrifice the
“perfect” result and its marginal benefits, and any further costs of
compliance or adjudication are spared.
The less restrictive alternative test converts the rule of reason into a
“maximizing” test by seeking to achieve the most efficient result.
According to this New Rule of Reason, it is no longer enough to show
that the result of the agreement is “good enough.” It must be the
“best” result. The Board Rule of Reason does not, and was never
147
meant to, achieve the “best” result. As Judge Bork noted, the rule
was never intended to require a court to “calibrate degrees of
reasonable necessity. That would make the lawfulness of conduct
turn upon judgments of degrees of efficiency. There is no logical
148
And,
reason why the question of degree should be important.”

142. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 49, 85 (2007) (referring to antitrust as a “tipsy” doctrine—“at a certain
point, the conduct tips suddenly from beneficial to harmful”).
143. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges
courts face in attempting to identify and accurately and consistently weigh
competitive effects).
144. See infra notes 192–193 and accompanying text (identifying the increased
litigation costs to defendants that result from a less restrictive alternative tests
because of judicial inconsistency).
145. Cf. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir.
1983) (“[U]nlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which
depend upon the content of the rules and precedents . . . .”).
146. See Crane, supra note 142, at 87 (considering the various approaches law firms
might take in response to a strict rule and the potential consequences of those
approaches).
147. Use of a dispositive less restrictive alternative requirement is also inconsistent
with the “antitrust injury” doctrine, under which a private plaintiff must prove that its
injury was “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.” Atl. Richfield
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (quotation omitted). The
antitrust laws were not designed to prevent agreements that are not optimally
efficient.
148. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227–28
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
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more significantly, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the
149
relative levels of efficiency of alternative restraints are irrelevant.
Under the Board Rule of Reason, if the restraint is net
procompetitive, it is legal regardless of the possibility of a more
150
procompetitive alternative.
A restraint is illegal because its
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive benefits, not
because there are less restrictive alternatives to achieving those
151
benefits.
Justice O’Connor made this point clear in her
152
concurrence in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, when
she explained that “an arrangement [that] has little anticompetitive
effect and achieves substantial benefits . . . is hardly one that the
153
antitrust law should condemn.” In such a case, the argument that
154
there are less restrictive alternatives “is simply irrelevant.”
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive prong
changes the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws. Under
149. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.29 (1977) (“Although
distinctions can be drawn among the frequently used restrictions, we are inclined to
view them as differences of degree and form. We are unable to perceive significant
social gain from channeling transactions into one form or another.” (citation
omitted)); see also Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859,
863 (1988) (“The Supreme Court well-summarized the issue in GTE Sylvania, stating
that antitrust does not exist to organize business in specific ways.”).
150. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 132, at 125 (“[T]he legality of a restraint must be
related to the basic antitrust goal of preserving competition and preventing
monopoly. If the restraint promotes and does not suppress competition, it should be
upheld under the rule of reason despite the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
This was the wise counsel of Justice Brandeis to which we should adhere.”) (footnote
omitted).
151. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal
Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 618 (1993) (“[T]he existence of an obvious and substantially
less restrictive alternative may be a factor considered in overall rule of reason
balancing, but it should not be elevated to a separate stage of analysis nor be
available as a ‘trump card.’”); cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)
(“The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been
accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search
unreasonable.”).
152. 466 U.S. 2 (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28 (2006).
153. Id. at 44 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for
Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 911 (1985) (noting that the
use of the less restrictive alternative test to invalidate agreements is inconsistent with
antitrust law, particularly when the anticompetitive effects of the agreement are
substantially outweighed by its procompetitive benefits).
154. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 44 n.13; cf. Struve, supra note 37, at 1466
(explaining that if an “administrative regulation is ‘rational,’ the existence of [less
restrictive alternatives] is virtually immaterial”). The Board Rule of Reason, of
course, still requires causation. That is, the challenged restraint must actually
achieve or further procompetitive benefits. A restraint that fails to achieve
procompetitive benefits might be illegal, not because there are less restrictive
alternatives, but simply because there is no causal relationship between the restraint
and the procompetitive benefits of the restraint.
See infra note 317 and
accompanying text.
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Chicago Board of Trade and after nearly 100 years of Supreme Court
precedent, Section 1 of the Sherman Act is intended to act as a
gateway prohibiting agreements that cause a net anticompetitive
effect on a market. The New Rule of Reason, however, uses Section 1
155
It
to prohibit agreements that are not procompetitive enough.
therefore transforms antitrust into an interventionist law where
judges are required to second-guess complex business judgments of
156
defendants.
B. Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Other Areas of Law
Incorporation of the less restrictive alternative test as an additional
dispositive prong of the rule of reason is also inconsistent with
virtually every other application of a maximizing, less restrictive
alternative test in other areas of law. The maximizing test is used
where a violation of the law, or an infringement of some fundamental
right, is permitted to accomplish some other legitimate and
157
overriding objective.
In such cases, the maximizing test is used to
158
minimize the violation or infringement and the consequent harm.
The key element is that there is an actual violation of the law or
infringement of rights.
For example, in U.S. constitutional law, a governmental policy that
infringes fundamental rights and liberties is subjected to a
159
maximizing test, strict scrutiny.
Any infringement of fundamental
155. See Meese, supra note 81, at 73 (explaining that invalidating tying
arrangements based on the mere existence of a similarly beneficial alternative
penalizes firms “for failing to benefit society sufficiently”).
156. See, e.g., Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 528 F.2d 1230, 1249–50
(3d Cir. 1975) (expressing concern that the less restrictive alternative test creates
dual problems of burdening business and putting courts “in the position of secondguessing business judgments as to what arrangements would or would not provide
‘adequate’ protection for legitimate commercial interests”); see also, e.g., Ross, supra
note 38, at 957 (noting that under the less restrictive alternative inquiry in common
law restraint of trade cases, “judges carefully reviewed and ‘second-guessed’ the
defendant if it appeared that the restraint was overly restrictive”).
157. The maximizing less restrictive alternative test was necessary in the Addyston
Rule of Reason because the analysis focused primarily (if not exclusively) on the
procompetitive benefits of the restraint. The maximizing requirement thus served as
the only check on the anticompetitive impact of the restraint. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. But see Roberts, supra note 41, at 1010 & n.244 (discussing Judge
Taft’s corollary to the Addyston rule that restrictions should be ancillary to the aims of
the agreement, not in their strictness, but in their extent).
158. Cf. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289 (1985) (proposing that the application of a per se rule in the antitrust
context turns on whether the restraint was unreasonable).
159. Such rights include speech, religion, association, etc. See, e.g., Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2789 (2007) (“It is
well established that when a governmental policy is subjected to strict scrutiny, the
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”) (quotation omitted);
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rights is illegal if a less restrictive alternative was available that “would
be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the
160
statute was enacted to serve.” As the Supreme Court has explained,
the purpose of this test is to ensure that the fundamental right “is
restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is
important to ensure that legitimate [conduct] is not chilled or
161
punished.”
Notably, use of the strict scrutiny maximizing test
became a significant part of Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence in the civil rights cases in the 1960s. Justice Brennan
authored several of the majority and concurring opinions and made
clear that a maximizing test—while not appropriate for antitrust
regulation—was integral for the protection of constitutional rights, as
the “[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
162
closely touching our most precious freedoms.”
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) employs a maximizing
test for similar purposes. There, the inquiry is used to permit “parties
to impose . . . restrictive measures inconsistent with the [law] to
pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that such
163
inconsistencies [are] unavoidable.”
Parties are allowed to violate
the law in furtherance of some other (more) important policy, as
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (“The term ‘narrowly
tailored,’ so frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More
specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require
consideration of whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have
been used.”). For a comprehensive analysis of the less restrictive alternative
requirement in other areas of law, see generally Struve, supra note 37.
160. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004); see also, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., 127
S. Ct. at 2789 (noting that strict scrutiny requires an “inquiry into less restrictive
alternatives”).
Interestingly, if not ironically, constitutional law borrowed the least restrictive
alternative test from antitrust jurisprudence. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
161. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666 (2004). In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the
Supreme Court explained, “[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed
in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” Id. at 488.
162. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that First Amendment freedoms are “susceptible of restriction only to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect” (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
163. Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 405–06
(2003) (quotation omitted). Maximizing tests are used for the same purpose in a
variety of other areas of international law, including, for example, constitutional law
in Germany (the “mildest means” doctrine) and Switzerland. See Struve, supra note
37, at 1464 (acknowledging the West German and Swiss economic less restrictive
alternative principles); see also, e.g., Sir Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as
Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 73 (2005) (“Under German law, limitations such as
the restrictions imposed by the City of Cape Town regarding billboards would thus
have to be capable of achieving the legislative or administrative aim (Geeignetheit);
they would have to be the mildest means by which this aim can be achieved
(Erforderlichkeit).”).
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long as less restrictive alternatives are not available. For example, the
WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures permits WTO members to institute regulations designed to
prevent the spread of diseases, as long as “such measures are not
more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level
164
of phytosanitary protection.”
This same rationale justifies the use of a maximizing test in Silver v.
165
Under Silver, statutorily authorized
New York Stock Exchange.
regulations are impliedly immune from antitrust scrutiny, but the
immunity is “implied only if necessary to make the [regulation] work,
166
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.”
The
Supreme Court explained the rationale for applying a maximizing
test in this unique situation: “[I]t was the specific need to
accommodate the important national policy of promoting effective
exchange self-regulation, tempered by the principle that the
Sherman Act should be narrowed only to the extent necessary to
167
effectuate that policy, that dictated the result in Silver.”
In all of these cases, the abridgement of a basic right triggers the
maximizing requirement. If a law, and the rights protected by that
law, must be violated to achieve some other goal, the extent of the
168
It is
violation should be minimized to the greatest possible extent.
not enough to show that the challenged measure achieves the stated
goal, or that the benefits of the achieved goal outweigh the harm to
the public.
Instead, when speech, religion, or some other
fundamental right is at stake, the law demands more than a
“satisfactory” or “reasonable” result; the means used must be optimal,
169
necessary, or the least restrictive.
The essential characteristics of these tests are that they are used to
minimize actual harm. There is, however, no cognizable harm once a
restraint has been determined to be net procompetitive. Proof of
164. Sykes, supra note 163, at 406 (quotation omitted).
165. 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text
(describing the Silver case and explaining that, although the Court conducted a less
restrictive alternative test, the Silver rule has been nearly abandoned).
166. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
167. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
292 (1985). A similar analysis is used in per se illegality cases, where restrictions that
would otherwise constitute per se violations of the law are evaluated under the rule
of reason if the defendant can show that there were no less restrictive alternatives.
See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 144
(2d Cir. 2003) (“It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication
are not favored.”) (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)).
169. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1972) (discussing the
maximizing aspect of strict scrutiny).
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some restraint of trade is not the equivalent of a violation of the
170
antitrust laws because all contracts restrain trade in some manner.
Chicago Board of Trade and almost 100 years of Supreme Court
precedent instruct that the antitrust laws are only concerned with a
171
restraint when it is net anticompetitive.
If the restraint is net
anticompetitive, there is a legally recognized injury, and the restraint
is illegal. At that point, no further inquiry is necessary and no
amount of narrow tailoring can save the violation. If the restraint is
net procompetitive, there is no cognizable injury, and it is legal.
The New Rule of Reason thus fundamentally changes the
underlying purpose of antitrust law and the role of maximizing tests
by requiring courts to narrowly tailor agreements that are legal. In
the absence of any illegal activity, the New Rule of Reason’s search for
less restrictive alternatives is an exercise in maximizing efficiency, not
minimizing harm. It therefore conflicts with the essential character
of maximizing tests. Moreover, it forces courts to second-guess
legitimate business decisions made by firms and thus violates the
basic principle articulated by the Supreme Court that a “business
enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve
efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other factors
dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure to
172
antitrust liability.”
C. Judicial Efficiency
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive prong
of the rule of reason is also contrary to the notions of administrative
173
efficiency and judicial economy that underlie much of antitrust law.
170. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (concluding that, because the
Sherman Act theoretically blocks all trade contracts, courts must interpret the Act’s
boundaries); see also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289 (stating that the
agreement in question was a trade restraint “in the sense that every commercial
agreement restrains trade”).
171. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2707–
08 (2007) (stating that the standard rule of reason test for determining a Section 1
violation distinguishes between an anticompetitive restraint that harms the consumer
and one that is procompetitive and beneficial to the consumer); Bd. of Trade of Chi.
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (asserting that the “true test of legality” is a
determination, using all relevant factors, of whether the restraint “promotes . . .
or . . . destroy[s] competition”); see also supra Part II.B (describing the development
of the net effects test).
172. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984)
(discussing business structure in the context of intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine).
173. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 71, at 145 (“Trial judges . . . feel burdened by the
complexity of their antitrust cases. Out of necessity, they may become ready to
dispose of more antitrust issues summarily.”); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 270-71, 271 n.180 (1960)
(noting that judges’ attempts to weigh all relevant factors of complex merger
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Efficiency arguments are particularly compelling in the antitrust
context because the laws cover a significant amount of economic
174
activity. The antitrust laws were designed and interpreted with the
recognition that it is not feasible for courts to micromanage firms’
business practices or identify all inefficiencies in economic behavior.
For example, courts have long used administrative arguments to
175
justify the potential overinclusiveness of per se rules.
The per se
test relies on a threshold finding that certain categories of behavior
176
Once that threshold is met, the
are “inherently anticompetitive.”
antitrust inquiry ends and the agreement is invalidated because of the
177
significant probability that the agreement is net anticompetitive.
The inquiry is cut short, despite the possibility that the agreement
may be net procompetitive, because of the limited marginal utility of
further analysis and the recognition that judicial economy is a

antitrust cases place extreme burdens of time and expense on courts as well as
litigants, and proposing that greater judicial efficiency could be obtained through
procedural techniques and stronger judicial management); see also supra Part III.B
(discussing the use of a maximizing test to achieve a policy objective in cases where a
fundamental right is infringed rather than in antitrust cases where the goal is to
ensure that competition is being encouraged).
174. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
75 (1983) (“The costs of applying rules often loom especially large in the
formulation of standards designed to govern a large volume of disputes. In these
situations a desire to minimize litigation costs by using bright-line rules may outweigh
countervailing considerations.”).
175. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2726 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
“sometimes the likely anticompetitive consequences of a particular practice are so
serious and the potential justifications so few (or, e.g., so difficult to prove), that courts
have” resorted to a per se rule) (emphasis added); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“As in every rule of general application, the match
between the presumed and the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty
and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that
a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.”); see also, e.g., Robert
Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical
Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983) (explaining that per se rules “are practical
rules of judicial convenience” but noting that, in the antitrust context, per se rules
are often only applied to conduct with “serious anticompetitive consequences” and
no business justification).
Use of per se rules has decreased over time, see, e.g., Beschle, supra note 73, at 475,
but “the per se rule is alive and well,” James A. Keyte, What It Is And How It Is Being
Applied: The “Quick Look” Rule of Reason, 11 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (1997), and the
Supreme Court has made clear that judicial efficiency arguments are still “part of the
equation,” Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
176. See, e.g., Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (“Certain agreements . . . are thought so
inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it
has actually caused.”).
177. The potential overinclusiveness of per se categorization has led to a gradual
decline in the use of per se invalidation. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718 (reasoning
that administrative efficiency does not justify widespread adoption of per se rules and
“relegat[ing] their use to restraints that are manifestly anticompetitive”) (quotation
omitted).
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178

legitimate goal of antitrust law. The finding of illegality is based, at
least in part, on juridical, not economic reasons—on the recognition
that the administrative and judicial costs and difficulty of further
inquiry into certain categories of behavior outweigh the potential
179
It is always conceivable that the restraint
benefits of the behavior.
may actually be procompetitive, but it is not worth the judicial costs,
180
181
potential errors, and the subsequent uncertainty to make that
182
determination. Thus, like other satisficing rules, the antitrust laws
sacrifice “perfection” for judicial efficiency.
Efficiency arguments provide a particularly compelling rationale to
eliminate use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as an additional
183
dispositive prong of the rule of reason. It is always conceivable that
there is a more efficient method for achieving the procompetitive
impact of a restraint—there is always a sharper needle in the
haystack. However, the marginal utility of identifying and requiring
use of the less restrictive alternative is outweighed by the costs and

178. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 175, at 1489 (recognizing that per se rules can
assist with “efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws[, which] is a justifiable policy
goal”).
179. See, for example, Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Container Corp. of
America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), where he wrote:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the
assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the
losses and that significant administrative advantages will result. In other
words, the potential competitive harm plus the administrative costs of
determining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must
far outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the
aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth
identifying in individual cases.
Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“One cannot fairly
expect judges and juries . . . to apply complex economic criteria without making a
considerable number of mistakes, which themselves may impose serious costs.”).
181. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 293–94 (1985) (remarking that, while “group boycotts” are generally
considered per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]xactly what types of
activity fall within the forbidden category is . . . far from certain”); Pitofsky, supra
note 175, at 1489 (noting that “there is a virtue in telling businessmen accurately and
precisely the location of legal limits on business conduct”).
182. As Justice Breyer explained, “despite the theoretical possibility of finding
instances in which [price fixing is] economically justified, the courts have held them
unlawful per se, concluding that the administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the
occasional ‘economic’ loss.” Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,
234 (1st Cir. 1983); see also, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 104 (“The antitrust
process is expensive, cumbersome, and not particularly accurate. We compensate for
high administrative costs and uncertainties by adopting a variety of presumptions, or
shortcuts.”).
183. Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 23 (arguing that vertical distribution restrictions
should be considered per se legal “to lighten the burden on the courts and to lift a
cloud of debilitating doubt from practices that are usually and perhaps always
procompetitive”).
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potential mistakes of identifying that alternative,
particularly
because courts have long recognized their inability to determine, with
any real precision, the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive
185
effects of a restraint.
186
In per se illegality cases, “the cost of condemnation is slight”
because the court is striking down an agreement that is highly
unlikely to have any procompetitive benefits, much less a net
procompetitive effect. In less restrictive alternative/rule of reason
cases, the cost of condemnation (or “false positives”) is great because
the court is striking down an agreement that it has already
187
determined to have a net procompetitive effect.
These costs
include not only the loss of the benefits of the invalidated agreement,
but also the loss of the benefits of future net procompetitive
188
agreements that are deterred or discouraged by the invalidation.
Conversely, the cost of false negatives is low, as the court is merely
permitting an agreement that is net procompetitive but perhaps not
189
as net procompetitive as it could have been.
In terms of antitrust
legality, there is no difference between a net competitive agreement
190
and a “more” net procompetitive agreement; they are both legal.
184. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 579 (1992) (“Further investigation and greater deliberation are almost always
possible, but after a point would yield little improvement in the quality of the
resulting law.”); cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 23 (“The same considerations of judicial
economy and legal certainty that justify the use of per se rules of illegality in some
cases justify the use of per se legality in others.”).
185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the design of antitrust
laws to avoid judicial micromanaging of business practices); see also, e.g., Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214
(1995) (discussing the constraints of time, energy, and money that often yield
imperfect information processing, and remarking that the errors increase as the
complexity of the decisions increase).
186. Dennis W. Carlton, Robert H. Gertner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV.
423, 425 (1997).
187. See Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 15 (asserting that, because of the high costs
of deterring beneficial conduct, courts should not attempt to ensnare all
questionable but likely beneficial practices to catch very few anticompetitive
agreements). Conversely, the cost of permitting the less-than-optimal restraint is low,
as the market is still better off with than without the restraint. See supra notes 123–
124 and accompanying text.
188. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 35 (2000) (“Standards that require adjudicators to judge
citizens’ actions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis demand considerable effort on
the part of citizens who wish to conform to the law in order to avoid sanctions.”).
189. See HYLTON, supra note 40, at xv (using economic theory to assert that where
“the expected costs of false convictions are greater than those of false acquittals,”
courts should create rules of per se legality).
190. See supra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (describing the Board rule of
reason test as the proper “satisficing” test for antitrust analysis, and arguing that the
less restrictive alternative maximizing test undermines the goals of antitrust law).
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Of course, in the per se illegality context, the potential sacrifice of
legitimate agreements is justified by the savings in judicial economy
and the avoidance of possible errors. No such savings are achieved by
use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry. Instead, the inquiry is
necessarily accompanied by tremendous costs to judicial economy
and possible errors, as courts are required to identify differences in
191
net competitive effects between actual and hypothetical restraints.
This leads to additional costs for potential defendants as it makes it
more difficult for them to determine the legal consequences of their
192
The high costs required by the less restrictive alternative
actions.
test—both in terms of current and future economic impact and
judicial economy—are thus inconsistent with the notions of judicial
193
efficiency underlying much of antitrust law.
III. PRACTICAL FLAWS OF A DISPOSITIVE LESS RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE INQUIRY
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry as a dispositive prong
of the rule of reason also presents significant practical difficulties in
analyzing restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The inquiry
adds multiple levels of complex analysis to an already complicated
test. It asks judges to identify with accuracy the relative competitive
effects of hypothetical restraints when judges already struggle to
identify the effects of actual restraints. These difficulties lead to a
number of significant potential negative effects, including
unpredictable results, a higher rate of judicial error, increased
administrative costs, and the deterrence of procompetitive behavior.

191. See infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text (explaining the challenges of
weighing the competitive effects of actual restraints against those of alternative,
sometimes hypothetical restraints, and arguing that this process increases judicial
inefficiency and costs); see also, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 38, at 10 (“[T]o require the
very least restrictive choice might interfere with the legitimate objectives at issue
without, at the margin, adding that much to competition.”); Diver, supra note 174, at
72 (“In the absence of clear standards, factfinding and offers of proof will range far
and wide. The rule’s audience will expend effort in interpreting the meaning of the
standard and in making successive elaborations of its meaning in individual cases.”).
192. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1983)
(factoring in the client-advisement difficulties for lawyers considering the risk of
potential lawsuits surrounding procompetitive business decisions if the court applied
a less restrictive alternative test). As Judge Easterbrook has noted, “judicial errors
that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are
not.” Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 3.
193. See supra note 182 (highlighting courts’ attempts to adopt per se rules in the
interest of judicial efficiency to respond to the complexity of antitrust cases).
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A. Difficulties of Application of the Inquiry
One of the primary criticisms of the Board Rule of Reason is that it
added confusion and uncertainty to antitrust analysis by replacing the
relative ex ante clarity of the means-oriented Addyston test with an
amorphous multi-factored balancing test. Critics contend that the
Board test’s global inquiry provides no meaningful standards and has
led to expensive, unpredictable, and never-ending litigation. As thenProfessor Easterbrook argued, the test “puts too many things in
issue. . . . Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended
formulas require.
When everything is relevant, nothing is
194
dispositive.” Critics also argue that the Board test is flawed because
judges and juries are unable to identify, measure, or balance with any
195
precision the competitive impacts of a restraint.
If courts cannot
identify and balance competitive effects with any precision, the
argument goes, how can they determine the net competitive impact
196
of a restraint?
Proponents of the less restrictive alternative inquiry argue that its
use avoids much of this complexity and the high costs associated with
197
the Board Rule of Reason analysis.
Professors Lawrence Sullivan
194. Frank Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST
L.J. 135, 153, 155 (1984); see also, e.g., Maxwell M. Blecher, The “New Antitrust” as Seen
by a Plaintiff’s Lawyer, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 45 (1985) (“The increased focus on case
facts under the rule of reason will . . . increase the uncertainty involved in litigation,
and this uncertainty will increase the number of cases litigated because parties are
unsure of what the outcome of a particular case will be.”).
195. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770–72, 774 (1999)
(recognizing, by contrasting the majority’s view with that of the dissent, that judges
could reasonably reach differing conclusions when determining competitive effects,
which indicates the difficulty of making this determination precisely and accurately);
Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 11 (noting that it is “fantastic to suppose” that judges
can balance economic effects with any precision because even economists would
likely reach different end results); Easterbrook, supra note 194, at 145 (“For many
practices, even the most careful economists can say no more than that there are
possible gains, possible losses . . . . Often the best anyone can do is offer a menu of
possibilities, some pro- and some anti-competitive.”). In fact, most of the “balancing”
cases in the Rule of Reason analysis thus do not involve any real balancing at all. See
Carrier, supra note 38, at 1322–23 (hypothesizing that judges wait for defendants to
prove the necessity of the restraint); cf. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)
(“To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to subject
the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our
government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure.”); Struve, supra note 37, at 1476
(stating that “[t]he factual issues suggested by the less-restrictive-alternative principle
may . . . be too narrowly quantitative or technical for the courts to attempt to resolve
them”).
196. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (outlining judges’ and scholars’
concerns of the near-impossibility of the Board test).
197. These proponents have relied in part on common law, see Alan J. Meese, Price
Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 112 n.178 (citing a
pre-Sherman Act case applying the less restrictive alternative test), and even recent
Supreme Court decisions, see Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League
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and Stephen Ross argue that the inquiry can be a useful shortcut,
particularly when inquiry into market power and economic effects is
198
difficult and expensive. The New Rule of Reason, however, actually
exacerbates all of these complications by using the less restrictive
alternative as an additional, conjunctive and dispositive prong and
creates a number of new and significant problems.
First, the New Rule of Reason requires judges to perform multiple
balancing tests.
The term “less restrictive alternative” is a
comparative term. Therefore, courts must initially identify and
balance the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects of
199
the actual restraint in question.
If the restraint is net
procompetitive, courts must then determine if any alternatives would
have achieved the same procompetitive benefits in a less restrictive
manner. In order to do this, courts must identify the procompetitive
benefits and the anticompetitive effects of each of the alternatives
and then compare them with the benefits and effects of the actual
restraint.
These additional comparisons can be extremely difficult, because
in most cases, plaintiffs will come forward with alternatives that vary
from the original agreement in terms of the likely procompetitive
and anticompetitive effects. That is, some alternatives will be alleged
to achieve nearly the same benefits, but with decreased
anticompetitive impact. Other alternatives will be alleged to achieve
greater procompetitive benefits but with the same or slightly higher
anticompetitive effects. In either situation, or any variation of it, the
less restrictive alternative inquiry requires the courts to compare the
Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 489–90 (1990) (highlighting two
Supreme Court decisions that used a less restrictive alternatives rationale), as support
for use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry in rule of reason cases. Reliance on
pre-Sherman Act common law is misplaced, as the test and theory underlying the
rule of reason shifted after the Sherman Act. See supra notes 52–55 and
accompanying text. Reliance on Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence is also
inapposite, as the Supreme Court has only used the less restrictive alternative inquiry
in determining the per se illegality of restraints, not in the actual application of the
rule of reason. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984) (stating
that under both per se rules and the rule of reason, the essential question is whether
the restraint hinders or encourages competition); Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d
1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
(concluding that because less restrictive means were available, the restraints were per
se invalid).
198. See Ross, supra note 197, at 492–93 (proposing that the presence of a more
limited alternative can stave off a long and costly examination of defendants’ market
power); Sullivan, supra note 71, at 851 (calling for an end to judicial inquiry based
solely on the existence of less competition-threatening measures).
199. See supra Part II.B (explaining the passage of the Sherman Act and the
development of the Board test’s focus on the ultimate competitive effects of the
restraint in question).
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net competitive impact of the original restraint with the net
200
competitive impact of the alternative restraint.
Each of the myriad of possible restraints creates a menu of
differing levels of efficiencies at varying costs. There is seldom clear
proof that one alternative is less restrictive and as effective as the
challenged restraint. Instead, each of the alternatives typically
represents a “half-way house,” providing some degree of the benefits
201
of the challenged restraint along with some degree of the costs.
Courts must therefore perform multiple complex balancing tests,
comparing the relative competitive benefits of the different restraints
while identifying and factoring in the added or reduced costs to the
parties of the restraints. Even if a court can determine that an
alternative restraint leads to greater net competitive benefits, it must
also determine if implementation of the alternative is feasible. In
200. As Justice Marshall explained, the least restrictive alternative test “may sound
like a mathematical formula. But legal ‘tests’ do not have the precision of
mathematical formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree.” Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). A General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) appellate panel has similarly noted that the determination of whether
something constitutes a less restrictive alternative “involves in every case a process of
weighing and balancing a series of factors.” Sykes, supra note 163, at 408 (quotation
omitted); see John J. Barceló III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment—the
GATT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 755, 770 (1994) (recognizing a “balancing test as inherent in the [least restrictive
alternative] concept”); Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, The Jurisprudence of
Precision: Contrast Space and Narrow Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 259, 266 (2001) (“[T]he very notions of ‘narrowness’ and ‘breadth’ in legal
analysis are problematic, because although these terms suggest precise measurement
in the physical world, their looser, more metaphorical usage in the law makes them
ripe for manipulation and confusion.”); John E. Coons, William H. Clune III &
Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 398 (1969) (noting that the least restrictive alternative
test in constitutional law is a “soft rule of balancing the interests of person against
those of the state” but conceding that the degree to which an alternative must serve
the state is “unclear”); Sykes, supra note 163, at 415 (arguing that “a least restrictive
means test . . . is a crude form of cost-benefit balancing”); Robert M. Bastress, Jr.,
Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 988 (1974) (advocating a balance
of interests and burdens when using the less restrictive alternative test when
analyzing constitutional issues in statutes to avoid overinclusiveness).
201. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 466 (1966) (examining the economic effects of a
variety of vertical restraints and explaining why the alleged less restrictive alternatives
“will often be inadequate or even irrelevant”); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
185 (1985) (proposing that a hypothetical less restrictive alternative can ignore
customer particularities of viable niche markets and thus can be too simplistic); Alan
J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 487 n.109 (2000) (“Less restrictive alternatives, however, are
very often both less effective and more expensive to administer than an airtight
exclusive territory.”); Meese, supra note 197, at 168 (observing that “many of the less
restrictive alternatives posited by courts and scholars are either less effective, more
expensive to administer, or both”).
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other words, given the costs of the alternative restraint, could the
202
defendant have implemented it? These comparisons are not simple
mathematical calculations based on empirical observations. Instead,
they require courts to define and measure competition and levels of
competitive effect and make judgments that are inherently normative
203
Each balancing test thus adds another layer of
and value-laden.
complexity to the analysis, and each additional layer increases the ex
ante uncertainty whether an agreement will be classified ex post as a
204
violation of the rule of reason.
Second, any uncertainty created by the Board balancing test is
magnified in the New Rule of Reason because judges are asked to
identify with precision the effects of hypothetical restraints. As the
Supreme Court has conceded, “[j]udges often lack the expert
understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to
205
determine with any confidence a practice’s effect on competition.”
202. See, e.g., Isabelle Van Damme, Sixth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview, 9 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 749, 755 (2006) (discussing the challenges of identifying and
comparing the costs of alternatives because simple monetary assessments do not
account for regulatory or value costs); cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 688 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that while a judge or attorney could almost always
imagine some less drastic alternative legislation, “the budgetary worries and other
practical parameters” can preclude Congress from implementing it); W. Cole
Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
665, 718 (1999) (“A prohibitively expensive approach to furthering the state’s
interests is not feasible, and, thus, fails to satisfy the least restrictive alternative test
because it does not qualify as a genuine alternative at all.”); Yao & Dahdouh, supra
note 9, at 39 (“Some alternatives, while theoretically possible, are not
practical . . . .”).
203. R George Wright has noted that:
Judicial judgments of relative breadth and narrowness are often in
themselves richly value-laden. Narrowness and breadth in the law typically
involve much more than an incontestable counting or measurement.
Instead, legal judgments that one rule is narrower than another often
depend crucially on what should be hair-raisingly controversial normative
judgments and on deep evaluations that are not remotely akin to
observations.
R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What They Do,
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 167, 174 (1997); see also Yao & Dahdouh, supra note 9, at 36 (“[A]
strict least restrictive alternative test virtually amounts to a normative judgment
strictly disfavoring consideration of efficiencies and other business justifications.”).
204. Russel B. Korobkin noted that:
Multi-factor balancing tests are less pure and more rule-like than
requirements of ‘reasonableness’ because they specify ex ante (to a greater or
lesser degree of specificity) what facts are relevant to the legal
determination. They still fall on the ‘standard’ side of the spectrum,
however, because they do not specify how adjudicators should weight the
relevant factors. Consequently, citizens often cannot know with certainty ex
ante whether a particular action will be classified ex post as within or beyond
the legal boundaries.
Korobkin, supra note 188, at 28 (footnote omitted).
205. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982); see also
supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty that courts and juries
face in balancing different competitive effects).
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While the criticism is valid in cases where careful and precise
balancing is required, precision is not typically a premium because in
most cases the effects are overwhelmingly (or exclusively) pro- or
206
anticompetitive. In other words, in most cases courts are not asked
207
to perform any real balancing.
Use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry, however, not only
requires courts to balance with precision, but requires courts to
balance with precision the relative competitive impacts of hypothetical
alternatives. If courts have trouble identifying and balancing the
effects of actual restraints that have been implemented, it is
unrealistic to expect a court to be able to determine the relative proand anticompetitive effects of hypothetical alternatives. Judges
cannot predict, with any confidence (much less any accuracy), the
likely economic impact of a restraint that was not actually
208
There are simply too many variables and too many
implemented.
unknowns. The less restrictive alternative test fails to take into
account the difficulty of accounting for the impact of exogenous
209
events and the inability to prove causation with any precision. It is
nearly impossible to identify accurately the relative economic effect
of alternative restraints because it is difficult to identify with precision
the actual economic effects of any restraints—actual or alternative.
As then-Professor Easterbrook noted, “[i]f it is hard to find what a
given practice does, it is impossible to determine the difference in
efficiency between a known practice and some hypothetical
210
alternative.”
Third, each of these problems is compounded by the lack of clarity
as to what actually constitutes a less restrictive alternative for purposes

206. Granted, courts may over- or undervalue pro- or anticompetitive effects to
avoid any real balancing.
207. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing what a typical rule of
reason case entails).
208. See Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox through Tripartite
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1067 (2003) (“Who can know whether a different
path could have led to the same result? Not firms that consider the broad array of
business options and must suffer the consequences of the choice, and certainly not
courts far removed from such real-world pressures.”); Yao & Dahdouh, supra note 9,
at 39 (“[W]hile it is difficult enough to prove that an efficiency exists, it is even more
difficult to show that no other reasonable means of achieving the efficiency (with less
anticompetitive potential) exists.”).
209. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 134, at 502–03 (discussing the limits of choosing
the optimal alternative).
210. Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 9; see, e.g., Areeda, supra note 71, at 146 (noting
the difficulty of measuring the degree of procompetitive benefits); Posner, supra note
4, at 19–20 (discussing the difficulty of comparing the procompetitive benefits and
anticompetitive effects of alternative arrangements).
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211

of the New Rule of Reason. Is an alternative “less restrictive” only if
it achieves the same level of procompetitive benefits as the
challenged restraint but with a lesser anticompetitive impact? If so,
212
how much of a lesser impact is required? Or, is an alternative “less
restrictive” if it achieves greater procompetitive benefits with the
same level of anticompetitive impact? If so, how much of a greater
213
impact is required? Or, is an alternative “less restrictive,” regardless
of the precise procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects, as
long as its net procompetitive benefits are greater? Or, as several
scholars have suggested, is an alternative “less restrictive” if it achieves
“nearly” the same procompetitive benefits with a lesser
214
anticompetitive impact?
Fourth, most versions of the inquiry place on the defendant the
impossible burden of proving that it has employed the least restrictive
method or that the restraint was “necessary.” While only the D.C.

211. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 973 (“Less restrictive in what sense? Is such an
alternative one that achieves the exact same type and degree of procompetitive
benefit while creating less anticompetitive effect? Is it one where there are fewer pro
but even fewer anticompetitive effects?”). Similar concerns arise with the use of the
less restrictive alternative test in the constitutional law context. As Matthew D.
Bunker and Emily Erickson explained:
This search for less restrictive alternatives also raises a series of complex
questions: Must the less restrictive alternative regulation achieve the
government’s purpose as well as the challenged regulation or will some lesser
degree of effectiveness suffice? How much less, exactly? What if the
alternative costs more to enforce than the challenged regulation?
Bunker & Erickson, supra note 200, at 260.
212. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 66, at 380 (arguing that a plaintiff must establish
that “a substantially less restrictive alternative is equally effective at the same cost”);
Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
701, 720 (1998) (stating that “obvious and far less restrictive alternatives must be
shown either infeasible or inadequate”).
213. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 149, at 863 (stating that the less restrictive
“alternative must be clearly preferable”); Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason—A
Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 581 (1986) (noting that “there must
not be a reasonable alternative for accomplishing the objective that restrains
competition substantially less”) .
214. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1602c (2d
ed. 2004) (“[W]e must ask whether a significantly less restrictive alternative would
solve the problem nearly as well.”); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1912i,
at (2d ed. 2005) (“[P]laintiff is permitted to show that the same (or nearly the same)
procompetitive benefits could be achieved by a realistic, less restrictive alternative.”);
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK § 5.4b (2000) (noting that courts should ask whether the less restrictive
alternative proffered by the plaintiff is “nearly as effective”); Meese, supra note 197, at
111 (noting that “some scholars have argued that plaintiffs should prevail even if the
less restrictive alternative is slightly less effective than the restraint under challenge”);
Sullivan, supra note 71, at 851 (arguing that courts should ask whether legitimate
objectives “can be substantially obtained” by less restrictive alternatives offered by the
plaintiff).
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Circuit explicitly uses a least restrictive alternative test, each circuit
appears to employ a de facto least restrictive alternative test by
allowing a plaintiff to prevail if it can prove the existence of a less
restrictive alternative. After all, the only method that does not have a
216
less restrictive alternative is the least restrictive alternative.
A judge, jury, or plaintiff’s attorney engaged in a post hoc
evaluation of a restraint can always conceive of an alternative that
217
might have had a lesser anticompetitive impact.
As the Third
215. See Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (“[I]t must be shown that the means chosen to achieve that end are the least
restrictive available.”) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d
1173, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing the least restrictive alternative test with
regards to the NFL draft).
216. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (recognizing
that a search for less restrictive alternatives requires proof that the means chosen is
less restrictive than “any alternative means”); see also Carrier, supra note 38, at 1337
(noting that “courts looking for a less restrictive restraint will, in effect, conduct a
least-restrictive-alternative analysis”). Even the Third Circuit, which rejects use of the
least restrictive test, requires a showing that there are no less restrictive alternatives.
See Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248 (3d Cir. 1975)
(explaining that the least restrictive alternative test is relevant but not
determinative). Commentators and judges, specifically relying on Addyston, have
stated the test in terms of requiring a showing of “necessity,” or the least restrictive
alternative. Thus, even the “weakened” tests, in practice, seem to require a showing
of necessity. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412,
431 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a restriction must be necessary to survive the less
restrictive alternative test); see also, e.g., Frank A. Camp, Antitrust-Franchising—
Principe v. McDonald’s Corp.—Big Mac Attacks the Chicken Delight Rule, 7 J. CORP. L.
137, 147–50 (1981) (explaining that the less restrictive alternative requirement
requires a showing that the restraint was necessary); Stephen F. Ross, Some Outside
Observations on Overly Restrictive Agreements and the Souths Rugby Case, 12 AUSTRALIAN
COMP. & CONSUMER L.J. 83, 89 (2004), available at http://www.dsl.psu.edu/
faculty/ross/Souths.pdf. (noting that a restraint is unreasonably restrictive if it is
“unnecessary to ensure an efficient” venture).
217. See Areeda, supra note 213, at 581 (“[A] troubling element of the lessrestrictive alternative analysis is where to stop. If four ventures of five firms would be
better than one venture of twenty firms, wouldn’t five ventures of four firms each be
even better and so on? This is a highly qualitative judgment for which there are no
clear answers.”); Carrier, supra note 38, at 1337 (noting that a court “can always
tinker at the margins” to find a less restrictive alternative); Frank H. Easterbrook, On
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 975 (1986) (arguing that
a case turning on a defendant’s answering questions about business practices that
have taken years to develop is difficult because “[s]uch explanations . . . tend to be
vague, hard to verify, even damning”); Handler, supra note 132, at 124 (“The
fundamental fallacy in this approach is that, no matter what the restraint, there will
almost always be a less restrictive alternative, and indeed, further alternatives to each
alternative ad infinitum.”). As Gary Roberts noted:
One can always imagine some other form of intra-enterprise control that
leaves the subunits with more operational autonomy. Thus, under this least
restrictive alternative doctrine, a sports league must constantly manage its
affairs in fear that the limitations it places on its member clubs in order to
maximize the league product’s quality or to reduce league production costs
will, upon arbitrary second-guessing by some antitrust court of a plaintiff’s
choosing, be found more restrictive than it [sic] might have been.
Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis,
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 381–82 n.176 (1986).
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Circuit explained, the least restrictive alternative “would place an
undue burden on the ordinary conduct of business.
Entrepreneurs . . .would then be made guarantors that the
imaginations of lawyers could not conjure up some method of
achieving the business purpose in question that would result in a
218
The futility of the
somewhat lesser restriction of trade.”
defendant’s case is of course exacerbated where courts only require a
showing that the alternative is “nearly” as effective in achieving
219
procompetitive benefits.
The addition of the less restrictive alternative thus creates
additional problems that significantly increase the ex ante opacity of
the rule of reason. These problems and the difficulty of applying this
New Rule of Reason may have a number of tangible negative effects.
First, the increased complexity of the analysis (and decreased clarity)
will lead to higher administrative costs for the parties and the
220
courts.

Scholars and judges have long decried the least restrictive alternative test in
constitutional law because of the impossible burden it places on defendants. As
Justice Breyer stated:
But the Constitution does not, because it cannot, require the Government to
disprove the existence of magic solutions, i.e., solutions that, put in general
terms, will solve any problem less restrictively but with equal effectiveness.
Otherwise, ‘the undoubted ability of lawyers and judges,’ who are not
constrained by the budgetary worries and other practical parameters within
which Congress must operate, ‘to imagine some kind of slightly less drastic or
restrictive an approach would make it impossible to write laws that deal with
the harm that called the statute into being.’
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 688 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985) (“A creative judge engaged
in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative
means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.”);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 141, 161 (1997) (“Subjective standards that turn on differences in
degree, such as a ‘pretty much equally effective alternative’ standard, provide little
constraint on their face.”).
218. Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1249; see also, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 153, at 911
(noting that the less restrictive alternative test “is too demanding since it would place
joint venture organizers at the hazard that others might come along later and think
of some method of achieving similar efficiencies in a manner that is somewhat less
restrictive”).
219. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (noting that an alternative can be
less restrictive if it has “nearly” the same procompetitive benefits). A less stringent
construction of the test—one that requires proof that the alternative is “substantially
less restrictive” or “significantly more procompetitive,” for example—eases the
burden on the defendant, but still creates uncertainty and invites ad hoc secondguessing.
220. Diver, supra note 174, at 74 (“The cost to both the regulated population and
enforcement officials of applying a rule tends to increase as the rule’s opacity or
inaccessibility increases.”).
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Second, the test is likely to lead to more adjudicatory errors, as the
less restrictive alternative inquiry increases the number of relevant
221
factors and the complexity of the relationship between the factors.
With each additional less restrictive alternative offered by a plaintiff,
the number of relevant variables and factors increases and their
relative values become more complex and difficult to balance. The
222
inevitable result is a higher rate of judicial error and false positives.
The increased occurrence of false positives is significant, as it not only
eliminates a procompetitive agreement, but also results in treble
223
damages.
The magnitude and frequency of these errors is likely to be
224
exacerbated by the well-documented effects of the hindsight bias.
According to the hindsight bias, decision makers tend to overestimate
ex post their ability to predict the ex ante likelihood of the
225
occurrence of an event. As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski explained,
“[t]he research on the hindsight bias shows that people blame others
221. Cf. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 295–96 (1960) (noting that errors may increase as
the number of relevant factors increases).
222. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 142, at 87 (arguing that an increase in variables
results in an increase in adjudicatory errors); Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 214, 216
(“[I]mperfections in human processing ability increase as decisions become more
complex and involve more permutations . . . . [H]uman ability to calculate
consequences, understand implications, and make comparative judgments on
complex alternatives is limited.”).
223. See Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 1177, 1234 n.273 (1992) (noting that treble damages are sometimes dangerous
because of the threat posed by false positives); Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating
Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1699 (2005) (warning of the legal
uncertainty that can result from false positives that cause inappropriate treble
damage awards).
224. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571, 576, 587 (1998) (noting both that the “[r]esearch by cognitive
psychologists has shown that the folk wisdom on hindsight is correct—past events
seem more predictable than they really were,” and that the bias is “large enough to
have an important impact on the legal system and has been shown to affect the two
kinds of decisionmakers upon which the legal system relies—groups (juries) and
experienced decisionmakers (judges)”) (footnote omitted).
225. As Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich noted:
The hindsight bias is the well-documented tendency to overestimate the
predictability of past events. The bias arises from an intuitive sense that the
outcome that actually happened must have been inevitable. People allow
their knowledge to influence their sense of what would have been
predictable. Because judges usually evaluate events after the fact, they are
vulnerable to the hindsight bias.
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24 (2007) (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g.,
Korobkin, supra note 188, at 48–49 (discussing the hindsight bias at length);
Rachlinski, supra note 224, at 572 (“The bias, in general, makes defendants appear
more culpable than they really are. The bias can cause judges and juries to find
liable even those defendants who attempted to avoid negligence by undertaking all
reasonable precautions in foresight.”).
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for failing to have predicted adverse outcomes that could not have
226
been predicted.” The bias is more pronounced when, as here, the
law provides a vague ex ante standard and requires an ex post, fact227
specific inquiry.
The bias has been found to be particularly
problematic in tort law where judges are asked to make ex post
determinations regarding the ex ante standard of care taken by the
228
The search for less restrictive alternatives presents the
defendant.
very same problems, as the inquiry requires courts to determine if the
defendant could have chosen a less restrictive method to achieve its
229
The impact of the bias and the
procompetitive purposes.
likelihood of errors are compounded here because of the ex ante
difficulty—for the parties themselves and for third parties—of
predicting the economic impact, or relative economic impact, of the
230
various restraints available to the parties.
Third, the New Rule of Reason has the potential of overdeterring
beneficial behavior, as the ex ante uncertainty and risk presented by
the less restrictive alternative inquiry (and its higher rate of error)
may cause some parties to refrain from otherwise beneficial and net
231
procompetitive conduct.
Conversely, because the opaqueness of
226. Rachlinski, supra note 224, at 588.
227. See Korobkin, supra note 188, at 48 (noting that the bias is “especially
problematic when a legal standard requires citizens to take only actions that are
‘reasonable’ at the time”). Although these criticisms are applicable to the Board Rule
of Reason, they are compounded by the multitude of additional factors that must be
considered under the New Rule of Reason.
228. Rachlinski, supra note 224, at 595 (“Even in circumstances in which the bias
affects both sides of a lawsuit, it is still a powerful force in litigation. Legal judgments
made under objective standards are, therefore, probably tainted by the hindsight
bias, thereby resulting in incorrect judgments of liability.”).
229. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 208, at 1067 (in determining the presence of less
restrictive alternatives, “the timing of the actors’ decisions is telling: a company
decides in advance whether a particular activity will achieve its objectives; a court
looks backward after the fact and after the success of the activity (or lack thereof) is
apparent”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American
Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV 797, 802 (1987) (noting that the inquiry asks courts to
determine if the “alternative was fairly obvious at the time of the agreement and
would have achieved the legitimate objective as effectively and economically”); Jack
R. Hlustik, Note, The Effect of White Motor Co. on Exclusive Selling Arrangements, 17
VAND. L. REV. 549, 555 (1964) (“It is quite easy to look back and ascertain the effect
of the alternatives; it is another matter to predict the competitive effect of numerous
alternatives with the ‘penalty’ for the wrong guess being governmental
intervention.”).
230. See Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A
Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91, 111 (1979) (noting that parties have difficulty
predicting the economic effects of their business decisions).
231. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2718 (2007) (noting that striking down procompetitive restraints “can increase the
total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust
laws should encourage” and “may increase litigation costs by promoting frivolous
suits against legitimate practices”); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
441 (1978) (explaining the danger of firms choosing to be “excessively cautious in
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the rule makes it difficult for a party to conform (or know how to
conform) its conduct to the law, it could underdeter anticompetitive
232
In other words, the unpredictability of the ad hoc, post
conduct.
hoc inquiry does not properly incentivize procompetitive behavior or
233
provide disincentives to anticompetitive behavior.
Finally, the
additional ex ante uncertainty engendered by the New Rule of
Reason is also likely to discourage settlements, as economic models
suggest that settlements are less likely to occur when the outcome of
234
the litigation is difficult to predict.
B. Application of the Inquiry to Vertical Restraints
Antitrust law’s struggle to deal with vertical restraints provides a
helpful framework for illustrating the difficulty of applying the less
restrictive alternative inquiry as an additional prong of the rule of
reason. Vertical restraints are restrictions imposed by agreement
among firms at different stages of the distribution chain, such as
235
contracts between a manufacturer and a dealer. These restrictions
are designed to make distribution of the product more efficient and
236
237
typically reduce intrabrand competition to increase interbrand
competition.
Courts have long had trouble discerning the
anticompetitive effects, procompetitive benefits, and net competitive
effects of vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance schemes,

the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure” to liability under the antitrust
laws); Tom & Pak, supra note 65, at 400 (discussing the overdeterrent effect of
uncertain rules).
232. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 188, at 36 (discussing the possible
overinclusiveness of rules); Tom & Pak, supra note 65, at 400 (noting the potential
underdeterrent effect of uncertain rules).
233. See Crane, supra note 142, at 85 (arguing that predictability is necessary to
incentivize appropriate behavior).
234. As Russell B. Korobkin stated:
The ex ante certainty that rules provide should encourage more disputes to
settle out of court and not require adjudication at all. The economic model
of litigation predicts that litigants will bear the high private costs of seeking
adjudication only if they have different predictions about the likely outcome
of adjudication . . . .
Korobkin, supra note 188, at 32 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust
Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 353–64 (1980)
(discussing the settlement process in antitrust cases).
235. See, e.g., Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray Areas of
Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(1991) (noting that “[v]ertical restraints are restrictions imposed by manufacturers
in governing the conduct of the distributors of their products”).
236. Competition within the same brand.
237. Competition between two or more different brands.
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exclusive territories, area of primary responsibility clauses, long-term
238
contracts, tie-ins, and other related restrictions.
For almost 100 years, starting with its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles
239
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the Supreme Court declared
that it was per se illegal for a manufacturer and its distributor to
240
agree on a minimum resale price for the manufacturer’s good. In
2007, the Supreme Court finally overruled Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative
241
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., and held that vertical minimum
price restraints may have significant procompetitive benefits and thus
242
are to be judged under the rule of reason. In overruling Dr. Miles,
the Court discussed the different possible procompetitive benefits of
resale price maintenance agreements: stimulation of interbrand
competition, increase in distributional efficiency, incentive for
retailers to invest in and carry the product, prevention of free riding,
facilitation of market entry for new brands, and increase in choices
243
The Court also discussed some of the possible
for consumers.
anticompetitive effects: facilitation of manufacturer or retailer
cartels, reduction in innovation, reduction of intrabrand
244
As the
competition, and barrier to entry of new competitors.
dissent explained, “[t]he upshot is, as many economists suggest,
sometimes resale price maintenance can prove harmful; sometimes it
245
can bring benefits.”
This is true for each of the different types of vertical restraints,
which has the potential to achieve similar but varying levels of
procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects. The extent of
the benefits and harm—and thus the net competitive impact—varies

238. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1977) (“The
market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition.”) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Eugene F. Zelek, Jr., Louis W. Stern
& Thomas W. Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CAL. L. REV.
13, 18–23 (1980) (discussing the complexity of the competitive effects of customer
and territorial restrictions).
239. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
240. See id. at 406–07 (holding that such agreements are void because they hurt
the public interest).
241. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
242. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (“Vertical price restraints are to be judged
according to the rule of reason.”).
243. Id. at 2715–16.
244. Id. at 2717.
245. Id. at 2729 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 6
(“Economists have developed procompetitive explanations for all of these [vertical
agreement] practices, sometimes several explanations for each practice.”).
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246

from case to case and from restraint to restraint. The competitive
effects of the restraint can fluctuate based on, inter alia, the business
need for the restraint, the nature of the industry, the characteristics
of the manufacturer and dealers, the relationship between the
manufacturer and the dealers, and the relative preferences of the
247
consumers. The actual economic effects of each restraint are often
difficult, if not impossible, to measure or identify with any precision.
Each of the restraints is likely to have disparate economic impacts not
only across different industries, but also within one industry, and
even within the relationship between two dealers and the same
248
manufacturer.
Significantly, many of the restraints that have historically been
viewed as having a lesser anticompetitive impact are often less
249
effective at achieving the procompetitive benefits.
For example,
area of primary responsibility clauses have long been touted as less
250
restrictive alternatives for exclusive dealerships. Both are primarily
designed to prevent free–riding and to prohibit dealers from
251
invading their intrabrand competitors’ territories. While exclusive
dealerships achieve these goals by creating exclusive territories,
246. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2722–23. For example, despite the anticompetitive
dangers of vertical price restraints, “vertical nonprice restraints may prove less
efficient for inducing desired services, and they reduce intrabrand competition more
than vertical price restraints by eliminating both price and service competition.” Id.
at 2723. Professor Handler expressed these concerns in the context of Justice
Brennan’s concurrence in White Motor: “If anything, the lesser sanction suggested by
Mr. Justice Brennan—that of partial profit passovers from one dealer to another—
may be more risky, since this device might conceivably be viewed as a horizontal
agreement among the dealers themselves.” Milton Handler, Recent Antitrust
Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 167 (1963); see also, e.g., William S. Comanor,
Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Marketing Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 983, 1001 (1985) (explaining that the competitive effects of vertical restraints
vary from case to case); Karen L. Grimm & David A. Balto, Consumer Pricing for ATM
Services: Antitrust Constraints and Legislative Alternatives, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 864–
66 (1993) (discussing the difficulty in determining if various alternatives are more or
less restrictive); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood
Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 194 (1997) (noting that “[b]ecause less restrictive
alternatives are less effective and more costly to implement, a manufacturer’s failure
to adopt them in no way suggests” that an antitrust violation has been committed).
247. See Comanor, supra note 246, at 999–1000 (noting that imposition of vertical
restraints may decrease consumer welfare for certain consumers).
248. See Goldberg, supra note 230, at 110 (discussing the economic impacts of
different vertical restraints).
249. See Meese, supra note 246, at 190 (stating that “very few, if any, of the less
restrictive alternatives identified . . . are equally as effective as exclusive territories or
resale price maintenance”).
250. See infra notes 252–253 and accompanying text (explaining that although
area of primary responsibility clauses are less restrictive because they do not require
absolute exclusivity, they are not as effective as exclusive dealerships).
251. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (listing exclusive territories and
area of primary responsibility clauses as vertical restraints designed to restrict
intrabrand competition and encourage interbrand competition).
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primary responsibility clauses are “less restrictive” because they only
require dealers to use their “best efforts” to promote and sell the
252
The less
manufacturer’s product within their given territory.
restrictive nature of these clauses, however, also means they will often
be less effective in eliminating free-riding and preventing invasion of
territories because a dealer with primary responsibility in one area
may still be able to do business in another area and free-ride off of its
253
competitors. Primary responsibility clauses are also more costly and
more difficult to implement and enforce. Violations of exclusive
territories are easy to detect; a competitor may not operate outside of
its area. Primary responsibility clauses, however, require a more
exacting and expensive effort, as the manufacturer must expend the
time and resources to determine if the dealer has used “best efforts”
254
within its primary area before moving on to another territory. The
added cost and complexity may cause the manufacturer to forego any
attempts to accurately monitor compliance with the areas of primary
responsibility, thus further diminishing its potential procompetitive
255
benefits.
The relative anticompetitive effects, procompetitive benefits, and
costs of implementation of the different vertical restraints thus create
an almost impossible burden for a court applying the New Rule of
256
Consider a situation in which a golf club manufacturer,
Reason.
lacking any significant market share or market power, decides to
forego its expansive national advertising campaign and instead
focuses on local advertising and marketing at the retail level, with an
emphasis on point-of-sale services and in-store displays and
demonstrations. For example, the manufacturer requires that each
of its dealers provide on-site demonstrations of the golf clubs, an instore “driving range,” video swing analysis, and custom fittings for
each customer, so each consumer gets a uniquely designed set of golf
252. See Meese, supra note 197, at 169 (describing primary responsibility clauses as
a weak alternative to exclusive territories).
253. See id. (“The fact that a firm has the primary responsibility for one area does
not prevent other firms from invading its territory and thus does little to prevent free
riding.”).
254. See id. at 169–70 (describing the difficulty and expense associated with
enforcing area of primary responsibility clauses because of the vagueness of the
clauses and potential disagreement between parties). A similar comparison can be
made between profit pass-over clauses and exclusive dealerships. See also Bork, supra
note 201, at 466 (describing profit pass-over clauses, exclusive dealerships, and area
of primary responsibility clauses as often being “inadequate or even irrelevant”).
255. See Bork, supra note 201, at 467–69 (concluding that area of primary
responsibility clauses are inadequate because of their expense and difficulty to
enforce).
256. See id. at 466–69 (discussing the inherent problems associated with each
vertical restraint).
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257

To encourage dealers to carry the brand, to prevent freeclubs.
258
riding, and to achieve all of the other procompetitive benefits of
vertical restraints discussed above, the manufacturer chooses to
employ a minimum resale price maintenance agreement.
Assume that a terminated golf club dealer brings suit challenging
the agreement under Section 1 and that the defendant is able to
show that its resale price maintenance scheme has significant
procompetitive benefits, minimal anticompetitive effects, and is net
259
procompetitive.
Under the New Rule of Reason, the case is just
getting started. The court must now determine the relative net
competitive effects of the alternative vertical restraints. Ignoring the
260
virtual impossibility of the task, assume that the court is able to
determine the following:
In terms of procompetitive benefits, the price maintenance
agreement was the most effective method for protecting the
company’s brand name and promoting interbrand competition, was
only marginally successful at preventing free-riding, and had no
impact on incentivizing new dealers to carry the product. A
territorial restriction would have been more effective at preventing
free-riding and encouraging new dealers to carry the product, but
less effective at protecting the company’s brand name and promoting
interbrand competition. An area of primary responsibility clause
would have been less effective at accomplishing all of the objectives.
In terms of anticompetitive effects, the price maintenance
agreement eliminated intrabrand price competition and served as a
significant barrier to entry, but did not reduce innovation. A
territorial restriction would have eliminated all forms of intrabrand
competition and reduced innovation, but would not have served as a
significant barrier to entry. An area of primary responsibility clause
would have reduced—but not eliminated—intrabrand competition
and innovation but would not have served as a significant barrier to
entry.

257. This scenario may seem familiar to owners of Ping golf clubs. See Brief of
Ping, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173680 (discussing
Ping’s policy of custom fitting golf clubs).
258. That is, in this case, to prevent customers from receiving the training, the
fitting, etc., then walking down the street and buying the clubs at a cheaper price
from a dealer who does not provide the same level of training and in-store services.
259. As would likely be the case where the defendant is just one of many
competitors in the golf club industry and therefore has no market power and no
ability to cause any anticompetitive effects in the overall market.
260. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the difficulties of applying the less restrictive
alternative inquiry).
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Under the New Rule of Reason, the court must now do the very
thing it is attacked for being unable to do—balance competitive
effects—multiple times on multiple hypothetical restraints. Then,
the court must perform yet another balancing act, this time
comparing the net effects of the hypothetical restraints against the
net effects of the actual restraint. The rule of reason is thus
transformed from a difficult and costly balancing test into a
completely unmanageable multi-tiered balancing adventure. Use of
the less restrictive alternative inquiry compounds all of the problems
of the rule of reason test by taking a difficult, complex, costly,
unpredictable and error-ridden task—balancing the net effects of a
261
restraint—and requiring courts to perform it multiple times.
C. Case Studies
Although no court of appeals has decided a rule of reason case
based solely on the existence of a less restrictive alternative, several
cases help illustrate the misuse of and practical and theoretical
262
problems raised by the inquiry.
For example, in North American
263
Soccer League v. National Football League, the National Football
League (“NFL”) instituted a rule preventing its owners from owning a
share of a team in any other professional sports league, contending
that the rule was necessary to ensure loyalty to the NFL and to
prevent disclosure of confidential information to the other
264
professional sports leagues.
The Second Circuit stated that the
purpose of the rule of reason was to determine “whether the
procompetitive effects of [the] restraint outweigh the anticompetitive
effects” and struck down the NFL’s cross-ownership ban after
265
determining it was net anticompetitive.
The court, however, also noted that “in carrying out a rule of
reason analysis, ‘the existence of [less restrictive] alternatives is
obviously of vital concern in evaluating putatively anticompetitive

261. The additional level of complexity varies with the different inquiries used by
the different circuits. See supra notes 104–124 and accompanying text (addressing
the variety of tests and burden shifting employed by the circuits).
262. A disproportionate number of these cases arise in the sports industry, where
courts have long recognized that some level of cooperation is necessary for the
product to exist at all. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–02 (1984)
(describing the importance of cooperation in preserving amateur intercollegiate
athletics).
263. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
264. See id. at 1261 (arguing further that procompetitive effects of the rule
outweighed any anticompetitive effects).
265. Id. at 1259.
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conduct’” and declared that even if the NFL’s restraint were net
procompetitive, the “NFL was required to come forward with proof
that any legitimate purposes could not be achieved through less
267
The court then gave a brief glimpse of the
restrictive means.”
potential misuse of and haphazard post hoc, ad hoc guesswork that is
invited by the less restrictive alternative inquiry, conjuring up
alternatives that it claimed were less restrictive yet as effective as the
268
For example, the court speculated that the
NFL’s ownership ban.
NFL’s legitimate concerns regarding conflicts of interest in the sale of
broadcast rights and tickets sales could have been remedied by
269
removing cross-owners from its broadcast rights committee. Putting
aside the fact that the court offered no evidence that this alternative
would have been as effective at eliminating broadcast rights conflicts,
this proposed alternative does not even address half of the NFL’s
concerns—conflicts of interest with respect to sale of tickets. Even if
the proposed alternative had addressed ticket sales, how can a court
determine the costs and benefits of such a hypothetical solution?
How can a court compare the costs and benefits of the hypothetical
solution with the costs and benefits of the actual solution used by the
NFL? And, assuming, arguendo, that the NFL’s rule had a net
procompetitive impact, why should a court spend its time and
resources attempting to fine-tune what is essentially a business
decision?
270
Similar concerns are raised by Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference,
where the University of Washington football team brought an
antitrust suit against the Pacific 10 Conference (“Pac-10”) after the
team and its star quarterback, Billy Joe Hobert, were punished by the
Pac-10 for committing numerous National Collegiate Athletic
271
Association (“NCAA”) violations.
The Ninth Circuit recognized
that the punishment—which included a two-year ban on the team
from bowl game participation, as well as a limit on the number of
football scholarships the school could offer—had anticompetitive
effects but concluded that the sanctions had a net procompetitive
effect in that they protected the integrity of college football and the

266. See id. (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303
(2d Cir. 1979) (alteration in original).
267. Id. at 1261.
268. See id. (noting that the NFL failed to show that its purpose could not be
achieved through less restrictive alternatives).
269. Id.
270. 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996).
271. See id. at 1317 (violations included Hobert receiving $50,000 in loans).
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272

NCAA. Nevertheless, the court noted that the sanctions would have
violated the rule of reason if the plaintiffs had shown that the
procompetitive benefits could have been achieved in a less restrictive
273
manner, such as through lighter sanctions.
Although the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden, the analysis
suggested in the opinion is troubling. The NCAA disciplinary rules at
issue in Hairston have significant and important procompetitive
benefits and the Supreme Court has long recognized that the NCAA
274
The
“needs ample latitude” to regulate collegiate sports.
anticompetitive effects incurred by the players who are punished
pursuant to these rules, in contrast, are minimal. The balancing test
is therefore simple: the procompetitive benefits far outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. Yet, the Hairston approach invites plaintiffs
and judges to second-guess and tinker with the NCAA’s authority to
govern itself. If a player had been suspended for eight games, is it up
to a court to decide if seven would have been sufficient? If a team was
stripped of three of its scholarships, would two have been good
enough? How can a trier of fact make these determinations with any
confidence or accuracy? And, why are we asking judges to even
address these questions?
District courts have seized on the invitation to engage in the
dangerous second-guessing invited by the circuit courts. In Clarett v.
275
National Football League, Maurice Clarett challenged the NFL’s rule
limiting eligibility for its entry draft to players who were at least three
276
full seasons removed from high school graduation.
According to
the NFL, it enacted the rule to protect younger players from the
physical and mental damage they would incur in the NFL when
playing against older, stronger, more experienced professional
277
players. Judge Scheindlin held that the rule violated Section 1 for
two independent reasons:
First, its anticompetitive effects
outweighed the (virtually non-existent) procompetitive benefits;
second, even if the procompetitive benefits outweighed the
anticompetitive effects, the benefits could have been achieved by less
278
restrictive alternatives. In discussing the less restrictive alternatives,
272. See id. at 1319 (noting that the punishment was not disproportionate to those
that had been allowed in the past and that, under the rule of reason, it resulted in
more procompetitive effects).
273. Id.
274. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
275. 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 369 F.3d
124 (2d Cir. 2004).
276. Id. at 382.
277. Id. at 387.
278. Id. at 409–10.
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Judge Scheindlin noted that age was a “poor proxy for NFLreadiness” because players develop physically and emotionally at
279
According to the judge, comprehensive individual
different ages.
medical examinations would have been a less restrictive alternative
and “better” method for evaluating the physical and mental fitness of
high school athletes—“[i]n such a scenario, no player would be
automatically excluded from the market and each team could decide
280
what level of risk it is willing to tolerate.”
Again, the less restrictive alternative inquiry shifted the focus off of
the competitive effects of the restraint and onto the judge’s ability to
conjure up less restrictive alternatives. And, again, the judge offered
an alternative that, even on its face, failed to adequately meet the
defendant’s stated objectives. The reason for the rule was to protect
the welfare of athletes by preventing teams from drafting players who
were not “NFL-ready.” The judge’s alternative removes this very
protection by allowing each team to use its discretion in determining
281
a player’s NFL-readiness. Even if the judge had suggested a system
that removed the discretion from the individual teams and therefore
superficially met the goals of the NFL, what evidence is there that a
test could be created to distinguish the fit from the unfit? How much
would the tests cost? If the NFL used such tests, could the plaintiff
then offer proof that there were better, faster, or less expensive
282
tests? More importantly, what does any of this have to do with the
competitive effects of the rule?
The misuse of the inquiry is further highlighted by McNeil v.
283
National Football League, where a group of NFL players brought an
antitrust claim against the NFL’s right of first refusal or
compensation rules (“Plan B Rules”), claiming that the rules
279. Id. at 410.
280. Id.
281. See id. (theorizing that each team could decide for itself how much liability it
was willing to incur by drafting young players).
282. Similarly, in United States v. Brown University, the Department of Justice
brought a Section 1 claim against a financial aid system implemented by MIT and
eight Ivy League schools. 805 F. Supp. 288, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1992) rev’d, 5 F.3d 658 (3d
Cir. 1993). Pursuant to the system, each school agreed that it would only give
financial aid on the basis of “demonstrated need,” rather than merit, and shared
financial information to set a uniform level of financial aid. Id. at 293. The schools
claimed the purpose of the system was to provide needy students with financial aid,
because absent the restrictions the schools would attempt to outbid each other for
the highest achieving students, leaving no financial aid for the students in need. Id.
at 304–05. The district court invalidated the system, concluding, inter alia, that any
benefits of the system could have been achieved by less restrictive alternatives. See id.
at 306 (asserting, in part, that if the institutions are actually serious about needy
students then they will find another way to achieve their goal). Notably, the court
offered no support for this conclusion other than sheer speculation.
283. No. 4–90–476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
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unreasonably restrained the movement of NFL players after their
284
The court concluded that, regardless of the
contracts expired.
actual procompetitive benefits, the Plan B Rules violated the antitrust
laws unless the NFL could prove that the benefits could not have
285
been achieved through a less restrictive alternative.
Significantly,
the presence of less restrictive alternatives was to be determined by
comparing the NFL’s player restraint system with systems used by
286
other professional sports leagues.
Thus, under the New Rule of
Reason’s less restrictive alternative standard, the NFL was in violation
of the antitrust laws unless it could show that its rules were as effective
287
as the rules of its competitors.
Hinging legality on the relative
efficiency of a firm’s competitors simply does not make sense and is
divorced from any sensible interpretation of the antitrust laws. The
laws were designed to ferret out net anticompetitive conduct, not to
punish firms for failing to be as efficient as their competition.
IV. THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE INQUIRY FAILS
AS A HEURISTIC
Although it is clear that use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry
as an additional prong of the rule of reason is both theoretically and
practically flawed, the question still remains whether the inquiry can
288
be used as a heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason. Heuristics are
powerful tools that are used frequently in economics to provide
economists with presumptions and shortcuts to simplify complex
289
The key feature of a heuristic is that it must be
theoretical issues.
capable of “actually making or recommending decisions, taking as
their inputs the kinds of empirical data that are available in the real
290
A heuristic “replace[s] abstract, global goals with tangible
world.”
291
subgoals, whose achievement can be observed and measured.”
Heuristics therefore serve as rules of thumb, and are able to reduce

284. Id. at *1.
285. Id. at *5. The test becomes even more unfair when the burden is placed on
the defendant, as it essentially requires the defendant to prove a negative. That is, to
prove the absence of any less restrictive alternatives.
286. Id.
287. See id. (instructing the jury to consider whether other professional sport
leagues were more “competitively balanced”).
288. As discussed at length above, the Addyston test cannot replace the Chicago
Board of Trade test because the two tests serve very different purposes. See supra Part
III.A.
289. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 215 (discussing use of heuristics and
their ability to simplify an inquiry).
290. Simon, supra note 134, at 498.
291. Id. at 501.
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the cost and complexity of analysis and increase the certainty and
292
predictability of results.
The Chicago Board of Trade test would appear to be ideally suited for
a heuristic, as its balancing test is constantly criticized for requiring
the identification of abstract, global goals—competition,
procompetitive, anticompetitive—that are difficult to quantify and
weigh. Commentators have therefore proposed a number of
293
different heuristics, including the Addyston test, all designed to
294
While the
minimize the complexity of the Board Rule of Reason.
295
merits of these other heuristics are beyond the scope of this Article,
296
it appears that the proponents of the Addyston test have overstated
its simplicity and that the theoretical and practical flaws of the less
restrictive alternative inquiry are fatal to the inquiry’s use as a
297
heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason.
292. See, e.g., Peter Nealis, Note, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust
Adjudication under the Rule of Reason, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 375–80 (2000) (admitting
that use of heuristics could have significant benefits, including greater efficiency, but
postulating that there would be some drawbacks as well).
293. Commentators have proposed a number of different variations of the
Addyston test to serve as a heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason. These have been
referred to as, inter alia, an ancillary restraints test, a functional analysis, and the
Addyston test. All of these tests have the same key characteristic—use of some form of
a less restrictive alternative test—as described above. See, e.g., Thomas Piraino, Jr.,
Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 685, 688–89 (1991) (arguing that an ancillary restraints test, instead of the Board
Rule of Reason, would simplify the litigation process).
294. See, e.g., Peter Carstensen & Bette Roth, The Per Se Legality of Some Naked
Restraints: A (Re)Conceptualization of the Antitrust Analysis of Cartelistic Organizations, 45
ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 368–69 (2000) (arguing for a heuristic that identifies some
naked restraints as legal per se as a result of public authorization); Easterbrook, supra
note 70, at 14, 17 (“Courts should use the economists’ way out. They should adopt
some simple presumptions that structure antitrust inquiry . . . . The task, then, is to
create simple rules that will filter the category of probably-beneficial practices out of
the legal system, leaving to assessment under the Rule of Reason only those with
significant risks of competitive injury.”); Daniel Ferrel McInnis, Editor’s Note,
Symposium: The Application of Empirical Economics to Antitrust, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 265,
265–66 (2007) (discussing the use of econometrics in antitrust analysis and
emphasizing that when properly applied econometrics can filter evidence into an
understandable and legally applicable form).
295. For commentary and criticism of these various heuristics, see, e.g.,
Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 17–34 (suggesting some helpful heuristics in antitrust
analysis); Richard S. Markovitz, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor
Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 78 (1984) (criticizing some of Easterbrook’s
heuristics).
296. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 10 (arguing that an Addyston ancillary
restraints test could potentially determine whether challenged conduct was
anticompetitive).
297. As early as 1918, scholars recognized the difficulty of creating a heuristic for
Section 1 cases:
To develop a just, reasonable and practicable construction of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and apply it to the complicated facts of our industrial and
commercial structure is not a simple task. No rule of thumb, no test capable
of easy and instant application to every situation, could either work justice or
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the less restrictive alternative
inquiry were capable of reaching determinations consistent with the
298
goals of the Sherman Act, the Addyston test is inapt as an effective or
appropriate heuristic for the Board Rule of Reason because it does
not provide tangible or easily observable measures or subgoals. In
other words, it is not a true shortcut. Under the Addyston test, an
ancillary restraint—one collateral to a legitimate agreement—is
reasonable if the restraint is reasonably necessary for the underlying
299
legitimate agreement to exist at all. Though this test was relatively
simple to perform when applied to covenants not to compete, the
perceived simplicity of the Addyston approach disappears when
300
actually applied to complex restraints.
Much of the criticism of the Board test focuses on the difficulty of
defining competition and the complexity of identifying and
301
comparing the competitive effects of an agreement. In most cases,
however, the less restrictive alternative inquiry does little (if anything)
to reduce or avoid this complexity, because the inquiry itself is a
comparative test that requires an equally precise definition of
competition and more complex balancing. The cure, therefore, may
be worse than the disease.
Under the Addyston test, a court must determine as a threshold
matter whether the restraint is naked or is ancillary to some other
302
legitimate activity.
This initial determination, as even proponents
of Addyston–type tests concede, can be onerous and may be the
303
“Achilles heel” of this approach.
Though couched in terms of
secure the economic ends for which the act was passed. The test of legality
must first be expressed in broad general terms, like the act itself; it must
then be applied with painstaking study and discrimination to the facts of
each case, bearing always in mind the clear general purpose of the act; the
border-line between lawful and unlawful must be pricked out; point by point,
as specific cases arise.
Negotiability and the Renvoi Doctrine, supra note 59, at 1060–61.
298. See supra Part III.A (summarizing negative effects of inquiry upon litigants
and the courts).
299. See supra text accompanying note 33 (explaining the reasonableness of a
restraint depends upon the purpose of the underlying contract to which it is
ancillary).
300. See supra notes 194–196 and accompanying text (discussing practical
difficulties courts will encounter in conducting the test).
301. See supra notes 200, 202 and accompanying text (providing examples of such
criticism).
302. See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that although separating
ancillary from naked restraints may be difficult, or in some cases impossible, it
should be attempted in order to examine the scope of the legal restraint).
303. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 66, at 376 (noting that courts need help defining
the lawful dealings to which there are ancillary restraints); see also, e.g., STEPHEN F.
ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 122 (1993) (“Significant disagreements will, of
course, arise in defining what constitutes a ‘lawful purpose.’”); Carstensen, supra note
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requiring only an underlying “legitimate agreement,” the
ancillary/naked distinction requires courts to define competition and
identify competitive effects to distinguish between a procompetitive
(or “legitimate”) agreement and an anticompetitive (or
304
Given the lack consensus over a definition of
“illegitimate”) one.
competition, there is widespread disagreement as to what actually
constitutes a procompetitive or legitimate agreement for purposes of
305
the Addyston approach.
This initial task is even more demanding
because every ancillary restraint is simultaneously pro- and
306
anticompetitive, as ancillary restraints restrict in order to achieve
some other legitimate procompetitive goal. Further, parties often
camouflage naked restraints as ancillary or procompetitive
307
agreements. The Addyston test therefore does not absolve courts of
the difficult task of deciphering the elusive meaning of competition
and of distinguishing the procompetitive from the anticompetitive.
Assuming that a court is able to determine that the restraint is
ancillary to a legitimate objective, the next step is to determine if
there are any less restrictive alternatives for achieving such an
objective. This step requires courts to identify and compare the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the challenged
308
An alternative restraint is only less
restraint and its alternatives.
restrictive if it is less anticompetitive than the restraint at issue while

32, at 10 (admitting that mixed naked and ancillary restraints may be difficult to
analyze); Carstensen & Roth, supra note 294, at 357 (“Restraints that might be either
naked or ancillary can be called arguably ancillary restraints. In order to classify
them unambiguously, a court must take detailed evidence about the economic
context in which the restraint operated and weigh the alternative
characterizations.”).
304. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 293, at 688 (“[A]ncillary restraints . . . are
generally legal because they are intended to implement the pro-competitive purpose
of an underlying cooperative arrangement . . . [but] naked restraints . . . should be
deemed illegal on their face because they are unrelated to any such purpose.”).
305. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. Compare Arthur, supra note 66,
at 378–79 (arguing that a legitimate agreement must be limited to agreements that
involve economic integration and voluntary exchange), with Piraino, supra note 293,
at 725–26 (arguing that a legitimate agreement must be a “true efficiency-enhancing
integration,” and should be one “that benefit[s] consumers”).
306. This is true at least to the extent that all agreements restrain trade. See supra
note 46 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 66, at 378 (“The tricky part is that even a naked
cartel restraint can be characterized as ‘ancillary’ to some supposedly beneficial
purpose . . . .”); Carstensen & Roth, supra note 294, at 357, 416 (analyzing an
argument that a lawful purpose can cure an otherwise unlawful restraint).
308. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 197, at 477 (arguing that legality under Section 1 is
determined by comparing the competitive effects of the challenged restraint versus
the competitive effects of its alternatives); supra notes 199–200 and accompanying
text.

2009]

THE MISUSE OF THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE

623
309

at the same time achieving the same procompetitive benefits.
While this task may have been simple when comparing the pro- and
anticompetitive effects of covenants not to compete, it is remarkably
complex (if not impossible) when comparing the competitive impact
of an exclusive dealership versus an area of primary responsibility
clause or other vertical restraints that perhaps could have been used,
310
The Addyston test and its less restrictive alternative
but were not.
inquiry therefore replaces the complex balancing test of the Board
Rule of Reason analysis with its own complex, multi-leveled balancing
311
Moreover, while the Board test rarely requires any precise
test.
312
balancing, the less restrictive alternative inquiry demands precision
because courts are required to distinguish between often-similarly
pro- and anticompetitive restraints.
An additional problem inherent in the Addyston approach is the
difficulty of proving causation and of accounting for the impact of
313
exogenous factors.
That is, how can one determine with any
confidence if a restraint actually caused specific procompetitive
benefits and anticompetitive effects? Additionally, how can one
determine if an alternative restraint would have caused similar (or
greater or lesser) competitive effects? Causation issues cloud not only
the comparative or balancing component of the Addyston test, but
also the threshold ancillary/naked distinction, where courts are asked
to decide whether a restraint furthers a legitimate goal.
The key measures of the Addyston test, the relative competitive
effects, are thus no more easily measurable or identifiable than the
314
Creation of
key measures of the Chicago Board of Trade test.
309. See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text. Of course, there is no clarity
as to how this determination is to be made.
310. See supra Part IV.B.
311. See supra notes 302, 308 and accompanying text (describing the two-part
Addyson test as: (1) identifying whether the restraint was naked or ancillary and
(2) determining whether there was a less restrictive alternative available).
312. See discussion supra note 71.
313. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 134, at 502 (discussing the limits of choosing the
optimal alternative). Granted, these problems also infect the Chicago Board of Trade
test, but the less restrictive alternative test does little to avoid or solve these problems
and therefore is not an effective heuristic.
314. Several variations of the Addyston test have been proposed to make the task
easier to perform by relaxing the less restrictive alternative requirement. For
example, Professor Roberts argues that ancillary restraints that are “reasonably
related”—not reasonably necessary—to a lawful purpose should be legal. Roberts,
supra note 41, at 1010; see also Arthur, supra note 66, at 380 (arguing that a less
restrictive alternative inquiry should not should be used and courts should instead
look at whether the restraint was reasonably necessary). Although a critique of all of
these variations is beyond the scope of this Article, the relaxed versions of the test,
while easier to perform, may fall short of protecting the goals of the antitrust laws (to
the extent they can be identified) by failing to provide a sufficient check on the
anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraint. See id. at 383 (noting that a

624

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:561

heuristics to simplify the Chicago Board of Trade analysis is a worthy
goal, and scientific, mathematic, and econometric models should be
incorporated into antitrust law to identify shortcuts to streamline the
rule of reason analysis. The Addyston test does not streamline the
analysis and its use as a heuristic therefore makes little sense.
V. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
INQUIRY: TO PROVE INTENT
This is not to say that proof of the existence of less restrictive
alternatives is irrelevant to the Rule of Reason. Such proof, however,
is directly related to the intent of the agreement, not its effect. Proof
that a restraint is overly restrictive (i.e., that less restrictive alternatives
exist) allows for the presumption that the purpose of the restraint is
315
not to achieve the procompetitive goal. After all, if achievement of
the procompetitive goal were the true purpose of the restraint, why
not employ the less restrictive alternative? In other words, one can
presume that a firm will use the most efficient—i.e., least restrictive—
methods available to it. If the firm fails to use the most efficient
methods to achieve its legitimate goals, one can presume that it did
not intend to actually achieve those goals. Instead, the legitimate
goals served as a pretext to cover the true anticompetitive purpose of
316
the restraint. The intent of the agreement can then be used to help
317
prove its competitive effects. Since 1918 and Chicago Board of Trade,

reasonably necessary-type ancillary restraints test may be too defendant-friendly and
lead to false negatives); Ross, supra note 197, at 491–92 (arguing that the reasonably
related test suggested by Professor Roberts is unlikely to prohibit any joint activity).
A less restrictive alternative test that is relatively easy to perform and is used as an aid
in determining net competitive effects, however, may be a useful heuristic for
judging the legality of certain types of agreements.
315. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1573, 1577
n.31 (11th Cir. 1983) (accepting that a less restrictive alternative analysis is useful to
indicate the motive of the defendant); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 758 (D. Md. 1980), aff’d, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting
that the less restrictive alternative requirement is useful to “illuminate the true
purpose of a restriction”); see also, e.g., BORK, supra note 27, at 36–37 (“Bad intent can
be shown by . . . the employment of abusive or predatory practices, or by other
behavior inconsistent with efficiency.”); Ross, supra note 216, at 91 (noting that
courts can infer anticompetitive intent from unnecessarily restrictive agreements
because “parties do not ordinarily enter into overly broad agreements for the
purpose of achieving narrower legitimate results”).
316. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 27, at 38 (“If efficiency would have produced
comparable results, why resort to such practices?”); Sykes, supra note 163, at 419
(recognizing the existence of the argument that “the least restrictive means
analysis . . . is political cover for motive review”).
317. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
602–03 (1985) (explaining that anticompetitive intent can be probative of the
legality of the transaction); see infra notes 342–343, 345 and accompanying text.
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this is the only manner in which the Supreme Court has used proof
of less restrictive alternatives in the rule of reason context.
For example, in his concurrence in White Motor, Justice Brennan
limited the use of the less restrictive alternative inquiry to providing
318
According to Justice
an inference of anticompetitive intent.
Brennan, the existence of a less restrictive alternative did not prove
that the restraint employed was, by definition, anticompetitive, and it
319
was not determinative in the rule of reason analysis.
Rather,
“presence [of a less restrictive alternative] invite[d] suspicion either
that dealer pressures rather than manufacturer interests brought it
about, or that the real purpose of its adoption was to restrict price
320
competition.”
The Supreme Court confirmed this limited role of the less
restrictive alternative inquiry over forty years later in Leegin, when it
overruled the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance
321
The Court recognized that these price maintenance
agreements.
agreements may have significant net procompetitive benefits for both
322
the consumers and the manufacturer instituting the restraint. Net
anticompetitive effects were only likely (or at least significantly more
likely) in cases where it appeared that the price maintenance
agreements were being imposed by the dealers, not the
manufacturers. In those cases, the agreements were more akin to
horizontal price fixing agreements, which typically lead to higher
323
prices and lower output and are per se illegal.
In its analysis, the Court recognized that proof of the existence of
less restrictive alternatives to the vertical resale price maintenance
agreements could be relevant to showing that the restrictions were
324
After all, if the
implemented at the insistence of the dealers.
manufacturer had a more efficient method available for achieving
318. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-72 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that the presence of less restrictive alternatives could give an
inference of intent but that the district court would need to make a finding of fact on
the issue).
319. Id. at 270–72 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that there would have to be
a negative effect on competition).
320. Id. at 270 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Carstensen, supra note
32, at 62 (“Unduly restrictive ‘regulation’ makes rational economic sense only if the
parties are also seeking to ‘suppress’ competition among themselves in order to gain
added cartelistic benefits.”); Meese, supra note 197, at 168 (“To be sure, proof that
defendants could have adopted a less restrictive and less effective restraint is
consistent with the hypothesis that the restraint exercises or creates market power,
and that the benefits it creates coexist with anticompetitive harm.”).
321. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715–16
(2007).
322. Id. at 2714–15.
323. See id. at 2717 (discussing cases involving horizontal price fixing).
324. Id. at 2717–29.
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the net procompetitive benefits, why use the less efficient resale price
maintenance agreement? The answer to that question, and the
presumption drawn, was that the vertical restraints in such cases were
simply pretext to hide the fact that the dealers had insisted on the
resale price maintenance agreement in furtherance of a horizontal
325
price fixing agreement. Existence of less restrictive alternatives was
therefore not used to prove the anticompetitive effect of the restraint,
326
but instead to permit an inference of anticompetitive intent.
The Supreme Court also used the existence of less restrictive
alternatives strictly as proof of pretext and intent in NCAA v. Board of
327
Regents, the landmark case where a group of schools with highprofile football programs successfully challenged the NCAA’s attempt
to limit the number of times each school’s games appeared on
328
television.
Pursuant to the NCAA’s plan, individual schools were
329
The NCAA
not permitted to sell television rights to their games.
instead entered into a national television contract that permitted the
330
broadcast of only twenty-eight total college football games per year.
Each school could be televised no more than six times in two years,
and the networks had to televise the games of at least eighty-two
331
different colleges every two years.
The NCAA argued that the television plan was procompetitive
because, inter alia, it maintained competitive balance and preserved
the “academic tradition” that distinguished college football from
332
professional football. The Supreme Court recognized that both of
these were legitimate procompetitive goals and acknowledged that
the “NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which
333
might otherwise be unavailable.”
The Court then identified a
number of other rules and restraints that more effectively achieved
334
these procompetitive benefits. With respect to the maintenance of
competitive balance, the Court noted that regulations on recruiting
and limitations on the number of coaches and players per team, as
325. Id. at 2719.
326. Id.
327. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
328. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
329. Id. at 94.
330. Id. at 92–93.
331. Id. at 94.
332. Id. at 101–02.
333. Id. at 102. The Supreme Court explained that by “performing this role, [the
NCAA’s] actions widen consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports
fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as
procompetitive.” Id.
334. Id. at 119.
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well as restrictions on alumni donations and any other sources of
335
With
revenue, were all better (or equally effective) alternatives.
respect to the preservation of the unique amateur nature of the sport,
the Court noted that restrictions on payments to players and
336
eligibility requirements were more effective options.
Significantly, the Court did not find that the NCAA’s television
plan was illegal because of the existence of these less restrictive
337
alternatives.
Instead, the Court made clear that the presence of
these alternatives was relevant only as proof that the procompetitive
justifications for the restriction were merely pretext, and that the real
intent and purpose of the restriction was to reduce output and raise
338
The anticompetitive intent of the restriction was not,
prices.
however, enough to make it illegal. Rather, the Court invalidated the
restriction because its anticompetitive effects (lower output and
higher prices) far outweighed its (virtually non-existent)
339
procompetitive benefits. The less restrictive alternative inquiry thus
helped shed light on the intent of the defendant, but it was not
340
independently significant of actual anticompetitive effects.
This is precisely how the less restrictive alternative inquiry is used
in the tying analysis and in common law restraint of trade cases. In
tying cases, the presence of a less restrictive alternative to the tying
mechanism is used not for proof of the anticompetitive effect of the
tie, but rather for the inference that the tie was utilized for an illegal
341
or anticompetitive purpose. Again, the rationale becomes why use
the tying arrangement if its legitimate goals could be achieved
342
through a more efficient method? As Professor Turner explained,
if a less restrictive alternative could perform the same procompetitive
functions as the tying arrangement, it is “quite reasonable to presume
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 119–20.
338. Id. at 120.
339. Id. at 113.
340. This analysis, of course, has also been used in the constitutional law context,
where the presence of obviously less restrictive alternatives was used to show that the
purported legitimate goals of a rule or regulation were merely pretext. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342–43, 353 (1972) (stating that the fact that a
waiting period to vote for new residents is obviously unnecessary to further the stated
governmental interest makes the restriction illegal).
341. Supra II.C.
342. See, e.g., Turner, Validity, supra note 79, at 64 (explaining that manufacturers
can achieve their stated goals simply by requiring higher standards of producers of
the tied product); Arthur H. Travers, Jr. & Thomas D. Wright, Note, Restricted
Channels of Distribution under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795, 824, 826 (1962)
(focusing on the “asserted business justification” and “measuring a legitimate
business need against the actual agreement to determine whether a less restrictive
alternative would have sufficed”).
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343

And, in the common law restraint of trade
an illegal purpose.”
cases, a less restrictive alternative was not used as proof of
anticompetitive effect. Instead, it provided “a justifiable suspicion
that the actual motives behind the restraint were other than the
344
legitimate ones asserted.” The presumption was implemented as a
heuristic for proving anticompetitive intent, not as proof of actual
345
anticompetitive impact.
It is therefore not problematic that the New Rule of Reason gives
weight to the existence of less restrictive alternatives.
It is
problematic, however, that courts use their existence as a proxy for a
finding of net anticompetitive effect. Such a use is not only
346
theoretically and practically flawed, but is also contrary to the wellestablished role of intent in antitrust cases. The role of intent in
antitrust law—and thus the role of proof of less restrictive
alternatives—is to help interpret and predict the effects of a restraint.
Evidence of anticompetitive intent is not the equivalent of
anticompetitive effect. Intent cannot, by itself, be dispositive of
347
actual economic effects. Regardless of the intent or purpose of the
parties, legality in Section 1 cases is determined by the actual
348
economic impact of the restraint.
As the Supreme Court explained in Chicago Board of Trade:
[T]he reason for adopting the particular remedy[, and] the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
343. Turner, Validity, supra note 79, at 64; see also id. at 62 (stating that if a less
restrictive alternative could have achieved the legitimate function of the tying
arrangement, “it is a reasonable assumption that the purpose of the seller in using a
tie-in is to restrain competition”).
344. Travers & Wright, supra note 342, at 824.
345. See, e.g., Covenants, supra note 36, at 509 (noting that courts use a less
restrictive alternative test as an easy way of finding the primary purpose of the
restraint); see also, e.g., United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 F. 733, 742 (N.D.
Ohio 1913) (“The fact that the restraint of competition was not limited to the locality
where the seller was doing business . . . tends to show an intention on the part of the
Towing Company to get more than reasonable protection incidental to the good will
of the business sold . . . . Such [action], unexplained, justifies a presumption of an
intent to dominate and control the towing facilities.”).
346. See supra Parts II–III.
347. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602
(1985) (“[E]vidence of intent is merely relevant to the question whether the
challenged conduct is fairly characterized as . . . ‘anticompetitive’ . . . .”); Levine v.
Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1552 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The rule of
reason analysis is concerned with the actual or likely effects of defendants’ behavior,
not with the intent behind that behavior.”).
348. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (noting that, despite
proof of the intent of a restraint, “the [Section 1] inquiry is confined to a
consideration of impact on competitive conditions”) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978)).
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regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may
349
help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.

The underlying theory is that “[a]n anticipated effect on
competition may be somewhat more likely to have emerged as the
350
true effect than an unanticipated effect.” Proof of intent therefore
can play an important role in determining the actual effect of a
restraint, as it can help a court “judge the likely effects of challenged
351
conduct.”
The less restrictive alternative inquiry should thus be used solely to
help courts interpret and predict the procompetitive benefits and
anticompetitive effects of a restraint. This, of course, is not an
insignificant task, particularly given the difficulty of identifying with
352
It is, however, a
precision the competitive effects of a restraint.
much more limited role than contemplated by the New Rule of
Reason, as it serves as an inference for discerning the effect of a
353
restraint instead of a substitute for an actual finding of effect. This
limited use of the inquiry maintains the appropriate focus of the
antitrust laws on the net effects of the restraint. It helps courts
compare the state of the market with the restraint versus without the
restraint, not, as the New Rule of Reason requires, the state of the
market with the restraint versus the state of the market with
alternative restraints. In cases where predictive and interpretive
assistance is unnecessary, proof of the intent of the defendant should
play no role. Thus, in cases where the actual procompetitive benefits
of a restraint clearly outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the presence
of less restrictive alternatives should be irrelevant.
349. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also K.M.B.
Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Intent
is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, but only to ‘help courts interpret the
effects’ of defendants’ actions.”) (citing New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F.
Supp. 848, 874 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)); United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource,
Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “effects are . . . the central
concern of the antitrust laws,” and that intent is but “a clue”); Nw. Power Prods., Inc.
v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (“An evil intent alone is
insufficient to establish a violation under the rule of reason, although proof of intent
may help a court assess the market impact of the defendants’ conduct.”).
350. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 225 (7th Cir. 1983); see also id. (“In
ascertaining effect or consequence, it is useful to determine the setting in which the
restraint was adopted and the effect or consequence which its instigators
anticipated.”).
351. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993).
352. Courts therefore rely on certain shortcuts, such as market power, to help with
the determination. See supra notes 289–294 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that “‘smoking gun’ evidence of an intent to restrain competition remains relevant to
the court’s task of discerning the competitive consequences of a defendant’s
actions”).
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For example, in Hairston, the procompetitive benefits of the NCAA
354
disciplinary decision far outweighed its anticompetitive effects. Yet,
under the New Rule of Reason, evidence that a less restrictive
disciplinary measure would have achieved the same procompetitive
benefits could have been used to invalidate the NCAA’s decision.
Under any reasonable interpretation of Chicago Board of Trade and its
Supreme Court progeny, invalidation of the NCAA’s action would be
the wrong result. The presence of less restrictive alternatives to the
NCAA’s decision does not convert it from net procompetitive to net
anticompetitive. Thus, regardless of the intent of the NCAA—good,
bad, or indifferent—its action is still clearly net procompetitive and
legal. As Professor Areeda has stated, “an admitted intention to limit
competition will not make illegal conduct that we know to be pro355
competitive or otherwise immune from antitrust control.” Evidence
of less restrictive alternatives should therefore be irrelevant.
Use of the existence of less restrictive alternatives to permit an
inference of anticompetitive intent instead of as a proxy for net
anticompetitive effect better reflects the practical problems inherent
in asking judges and juries to differentiate small incremental
356
differences in competitive effects. Given the difficulties judges have
identifying and comparing competitive impact with any accuracy or
precision, it is illogical to hinge the legality of a net procompetitive
restraint on a finding that a hypothetical alternative is less restrictive.
If used as just one factor in the overall analysis, the dangers of the
errors are minimized. A false positive—that is, an erroneous finding
that an alternative is less restrictive—should not be outcomedeterminative when errors are likely and unavoidable. This is
particularly true in cases, such as Hairston, where a court has already
determined that the net effects of the restraint are overwhelmingly
357
procompetitive.
Clear evidence that significantly less restrictive alternatives were
available would allow for a strong inference of anticompetitive intent
and would have a potentially significant role in discerning net
354. Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the penalties imposed were less severe than would have been acceptable); see
supra note 274 and accompanying text.
355. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 224 F.3d at 948 (quoting 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW
§ 1506 (1986)); see also Jorde & Teece, supra note 151, at 618 (“[T]he existence of an
obvious and substantially less restrictive alternative may be a factor considered in
overall rule of reason balancing, but it should not be elevated to a separate stage of
analysis nor be available as a ‘trump card.’”).
356. See supra Part III.A (explaining the difficulties courts encounter in applying
the New Rule of Reason).
357. Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319.
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358

Evidence of the availability of slightly less
competitive effects.
restrictive alternatives, however, would be given little weight and play
little or no role in the determination of net effects, because, as the
Ninth Circuit has noted, “ambiguous indications of intent do not
help us predict [the] consequences [of a defendant’s acts] and are
therefore of no value to a court analyzing a restraint under the rule
of reason, where the court’s ultimate role is to determine the net
359
effects of those acts.” Regardless of the strength of the evidence, its
use would be properly limited to aiding in the determination of the
economic impact of the restraint.
Proof of less restrictive alternatives should therefore be used only
in situations where it can actually assist a court in determining the net
competitive effect of the restraint in question. In most cases, courts
are rarely required to engage in any precise balancing because the
360
challenged restraint is either clearly pro- or anticompetitive.
In
cases where there is equally strong or weak evidence of both pro and
anticompetitive impact, or where the economic impact is difficult
determine, the existence of less restrictive alternatives can play a
significant role in helping a court interpret and predict the impact of
361
the restraint and serve as a tiebreaker.
Proof of less restrictive
alternatives can also be used to support or confirm the evidence of
actual economic effects. This is precisely how the Supreme Court
362
used the existence of the less restrictive alternatives in NCAA.
In
such cases, it is not a question of searching for a more efficient
alternative as a proxy for a finding of net anticompetitiveness.
Instead, the inquiry is simply a means to aid a court in predicting,
358. Thus, a grossly overly restrictive restraint (one that no “reasonable
businessperson” would employ) would likely be judged illegal—not because of intent
alone, but because of the strong inference of anticompetitive effect.
359. Cal. Dental, 224 F.3d at 948 (quotation omitted).
360. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n, 224 F.3d at 948 (discussing “the well-established
pattern of the Supreme Court to examine intent only in those close cases where the
plaintiff falls short of proving that the defendant’s actions were anticompetitive”);
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953) (reasoning that
unlawful intent can make an otherwise reasonable restraint unreasonable). As the
Second Circuit noted:
Distinguishing between efficient and predatory conduct is extremely difficult
because it is frequently the case that ‘[c]ompetitive and exclusionary
conduct look alike.’ Evidence of intent and effect helps the trier of fact to
evaluate the actual effect of challenged business practices in light of the
intent of those who resort to such practices.
U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1359 (2d Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
362. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (holding that the
evidence that less restrictive alternatives would preserve the integrity of the college
football and would increase output meant that the NCAA’s restrictions were
anticompetitive); see also supra notes 333–338 and accompanying text.
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identifying, and interpreting the net impact of a restraint that
simultaneously presents strong anticompetitive effects and
procompetitive benefits.
The New Rule of Reason therefore misuses the less restrictive
alternative inquiry and fundamentally changes the purpose of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. The inquiry must be eliminated as a
dispositive prong and lower courts must return the focus of antitrust
analysis to the net competitive effects of the restraint.
CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted the theoretical and practical flaws of
using the less restrictive alternative inquiry as an independent and
dispositive prong of the rule of reason analysis. The inquiry, which
has been adopted by each of the federal circuits, has created a new
rule of reason that is fundamentally inconsistent with the goals of the
Sherman Act and is virtually impossible to perform. The search for
less restrictive alternatives should play a more limited role in Section
1 scrutiny, serving as proof of intent. This role will help courts
identify the net competitive effects of restraints and maintain the
focus of antitrust law on the promotion and protection of
competition.

